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INTRODUCTION

The theme of this article can be stated simply: In order to improve the
manner in which boards of directors function and to ensure that important
information about boards is made available to investors, the Securities and
Exchange Commission should require reporting companies to disclose considerably more information about their boards of directors.
There are three concerns which underlie this proposal. First, ineffective
performance by many corporate boards leads to below optimal corporate efficiency. Second, information about boards of directors that is potentially important to investment decisions is not now available to the public. Third, the
paucity of meaningful information that is available about boards serves to undermine the operation of a system of fair corporate suffrage.
This article is divided into two parts. The first sets forth our reasons for
believing the SEC should require disclosure of additional information about
the boards of all reporting companies. It includes discussion of:
(a) the background of the disclosure provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which makes clear that the SEC can properly mandate
disclosure for the purpose of influencing corporate conduct where the information to be disclosed is important to decisions to be made by investors;
(b) the relevance of a properly functioning board to the efficient operation of corporations in a free-market economy as well as to the integrity of
the disclosure process administered by the SEC;
(c) the importance of information about boards to individuals and institutions that make investment, disinvestment, and corporate suffrage decisions;
(d) the advantages of using disclosure rather than either ad hoc enforcement or mandatory requirements to influence constructively the functioning of corporate boards of directors.
The second part of this article describes the elements of our proposed
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disclosure system-a system that focuses on the processes by which boards
operate. We propose that the SEC require disclosure of information about
individual nominees for election as directors, the procedures and criteria used
by boards to select nominees, the organization and activities of boards, and
the reason for all resignations of directors.
Our proposal is limited; it may be viewed by some as too limited when
evaluated in terms of our concerns. We recognize that improving disclosure
about corporate procedures cannot ensure an improvement in corporate conduct, particularly since altering the procedures themselves cannot give that
assurance. However, there are many instances in which a legal system cannot
assure a desired outcome but is limited to creating an environment in which
that outcome is more likely.' In the case of boards of directors, directors cannot be made to perform responsibly simply by being told they must do so,
and the threat of liability has failed to accomplish desired results. The time
has come, we believe, to attempt to stimulate constructive change by relying
on disclosure.
I
THE CASE FOR A DISCLOSURE APPROACH

A.

Legislative History and Background

An examination of the background of the federal securities laws makes it
clear that Congress was aware of the power of disclosure when it passed those
laws in the midst of the Great Depression. More specifically, Congress anticipated that the disclosures to be required by the SEC would influence investors' views about the importance of certain information and would encourage
or discourage certain kinds of corporate conduct.
The Commission used its disclosure authority for these purposes and, in
general, SEC disclosure requirements seemingly calculated to influence corporate conduct were challenged only when it appeared unlikely that the data to
be disclosed should or would be considered important by investors.
1. Legislative History
The formal legislative documents pertaining to the securities laws indicate
that Congress anticipated that disclosure would influence the activities of corporate directors, but do not make clear how Congress thought that process
would work. The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, in its
2
report on the Securities Act of 1933, stated,
Honesty, care, and competence are the demands of trusteeship. These demands are made by the bill on the directors of the issuer ....
1.
2.

See C. SCHULTZE, PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTERESTS (1977).
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).

If it be said that
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the imposition of such responsibility upon these persons will be to alter corporate organization and corporate practice in this country, such a result is
only what your committee expects .... Directors should assume the responsibility of directing and if their manifold activities make real directing impossible, they should be held responsible to the unsuspecting public for their
neglect.
In adopting the 1934 Act Congress stated that its objective in the regulation of proxy solicitation3 was "fair corporate suffrage.1 4 The House report
did not elaborate on what was meant by that term, but did go on to discuss
the existing obstacles to that objective. The concern was that insiders would
have little difficulty retaining their control "without an adequate disclosure of
their interest and without an adequate explanation of the management
policies they intend to pursue." 5 There was inadequate disclosure of the
reasons for the solicitation of proxies and the use to which they would be put.
The Senate report also noted that stockholders should be enlightened about
the financial condition of the corporation and about "major questions of pol'6
icy, which are decided at stockholders' meetings.
2.

Literature of the Day

While the legislative documents do not make clear how Congress believed
disclosure would lead to fair corporate suffrage, a review of the literature of
the day provides important insights into the expectations of the policymakers
who fashioned the securities laws. Those policymakers clearly understood the
manner in which the SEC would influence the behavior of corporations by
use of its disclosure authority.
The framers of the securities laws were aware that attaining shareholder
democracy, in the political sense of that term, was not a realistic objective.
Professors Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner Means, the former a powerful
member of the New Deal Brain Trust, in their classic work The Modern Corporation and Private Property, had demonstrated that control of the large corporation had become separated from its ownership. 7 Berle and Means recognized
that two approaches might be utilized to influence directors' conduct: stricter
application of fiduciary principles and expanded disclosure requirements.'
Professor William Z. Ripley, whom Berle and Means acknowledged as the

3. Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970)).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934).
5. Id.
6. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934).
7. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, chapters IV
and V (1932).
8. Berle had written earlier that corporate powers of control were held in a fiduciary capacity
and that the law must be used to constrain directors and managers in their exercise of corporate
power. See Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
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pioneer in their field, 9 had emphasized earlier the merits of disclosure.1 ° He
made it clear, however, that while disclosure would influence corporate behavior, it was unlikely to do so through an upsurge in shareholder activism:11
No one believes that a great enterprise can be operated by town meeting. It
never has been done successfully; nor will it ever be .... Nor is it true that
the primary purpose of publicity, the sharing of full information with
owners, is to enable these shareholders to obtrude themselves obsequiously
upon their own managements.
Rather, Ripley noted, information about the corporation, its board, and its
operations would have an impact because a select group of sophisticated investors would understand the information, would act on it, and also would
translate it into terms meaningful to the mass of investors and disseminate
the information to them.1 2 Thus, the work of Ripley, and Berle and Means,
taken together, made clear that disclosure would promote corporate democracy not by stimulating ordinary shareholders to attend annual meetings and
cast informed votes but through much more indirect and sophisticated
13
mechanisms.
The work of other scholars and commentators over the same period made
clear that the SEC by requiring disclosure could be expected to influence both
corporate conduct and investors' assessments of that conduct. The seminal
observation in this regard was made by Louis D. Brandeis, who extolled the
virtue of disclosure as a regulator in the classic statement, "Sunlight is the best
disinfectant; electric light the best policeman. ' 14 Professor Allison Anderson,
9.
10.

BERLE AND MEANS,

supra note 7, at ix.

He wrote that "[s]tockholders are entitled to adequate information, and the state and
general public have a right to the same privilege." W. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET
165 (1926).
11. Id. at 168-69.
12. Id. The observation anticipates by many years the proponents of the efficient-market
theory. See Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE
383 (1970). It is also consistent with the views of somewhat stronger believers in the efficacy of
full disclosure that the principal value of disclosure is for the experts who distill the information
and make it available to non-experts. Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. L. 631
(1973).
Perhaps Ripley's most far sighted suggestion, however, was one he partially attributed to Berle:
to create a permanent agency to be more representative of the shareholders' interest. "Such a
body, either created out of hand or else evolved from present boards of directors, might be
expressly empowered in the charter to assume certain responsibilities and to perform certain
functions by way of check-up, so to speak. Its primary function would have to do with adequate
publicity through independent audit." W. RIPLEY, supra note 10, at 133. He saw little prospect of
this with boards of directors as then constituted. Id. at 139.
13. The complementary views of Ripley, Berle, Means and other scholars were reflected in
the substance of the federal securities laws adopted in 1933 and 1934. Knauss, A Reappraisal of the
Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 613-15 (1964).
14. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1913). Brandeis had long since been appointed
to the Supreme Court when the securities laws were passed, but the influence of his ideas was as
strong as if he had been a member of Roosevelt's "Brain Trust." See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 123 (2d ed. 1961).
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in her study of the securities laws, states that the decision by the Roosevelt
administration and Congress to rely heavily on disclosure-rather than attempt direct substantive regulation of corporate conduct-reflected the influence of Brandeis' observation. 15
That this was so, and that the SEC was expected to decide what corporate
activities were in need of policing and to use disclosure to police them, are
evidenced by the contemporary writing of two other scholars, both of whom
were important in the Roosevelt administration and both of whom were subsequently named to the Supreme Court. After the adoption of the Securities
Act in 1933, Professor Felix Frankfurter stated:'"
The Securities Act may well exercise indirect but important influence . . .
upon corporate managers. .

.

. By compelling full publicity of 'every essen-

tially important element attending the issue of new securities' so that the public may have an opportunity to understand what it buys, the Act seeks to
promote standards of competence and candor in dealing with the public....
There is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force knowledge of them
into the open is largely to restrain their happening. Many practices safely
pursued in private lose their justification in public. Thus social standards
newly defined gradually establish themselves as new business habits.
Similarly, Professor William 0. Douglas observed that"7
[p]ublicity alone can accomplish much-not publicity in the sense of a registration in some dusty file in Washington or in some state capitol, but publicity in the sense of direct and unequivocal statement in the periodical
reports to stockholders ....
That simple expedient will go far as a corrective
of conditions which have been constantly recurring in our corporate history. Its prophylactic effects will equal in importance any other single measure
which can be adopted.
Thus, it seems clear Congress fully understood the power of disclosure
and the manner in which the SEC would influence corporate conduct by requiring disclosure.

3.

Subsequent Developments
The view that disclosure is to be used by the SEC as a regulatory tool has

gained widespread support. In the Disclosure Policy Study-known as the
Wheat Report-the SEC's philosophy of disclosure was set forth as follows: 8

15.

Anderson, The Disclosure Process in FederalSecurities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25

HASTINGS

L.Q. 311, 318, 330 (1974). Anderson also notes that the choice of disclosure rather than direct
regulation to achieve substantive goals was partly motivated by political considerations. Id. at 331.
16. Frankfurter, The FederalSecurities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, 53, at 55.
17. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1323-24 (1934).
18.

Disclosure Policy Study (Wheat Report) 10 (1969).

The deterrent capacity and objective of disclosure has been recognized by the courts. In
Laurenzano v. Einbinder, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), a court refused to dismiss a complaint for lack of a causal relationship between an allegedly misleading proxy statement and
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The emphasis on disclosure rests on two considerations. One relates to the
proper function of the Federal government in investment matters. Apart
from the prevention of fraud and manipulation, the draftsmen of the '33 and
'34 Acts viewed that responsibility as being primarily one of seeing to it that
investors and speculators had access to enough information to enable them to
arrive at their own rational decisions. The other, less direct consideration
rests on the belief that appropriate publicity tends to deter questionable practices and to elevate standards of business conduct.
Where SEC disclosure requirements or proposed requirements have been
the subject of controversy, the dispute usually has focused not on whether
disclosure can properly be used as a regulator but on whether the information to be disclosed is material to decisions of legitimate concern to the
Commission-those involving purchase, sale, and voting of securities. 19 The
Commission has declined to use disclosure to pursue social objectives, such as
environmental protection, where it has not viewed the information involved to
be of particular importance to investors.20 And while in some cases the SEC
has not made clear the primary purpose for which disclosure has been
required,2 1 in others it has made clear that disclosure is being required
injury to the plaintiff where the defendants owned sufficient shares to approve the transaction
without obtaining any proxies. The court observed that it could not be said that the defendants
would have used their power in the same way if they were required to make full disclosure of the
facts. In Mills v. Electric Auto Lite, 396 U.S. 375 (1970), the Supreme Court found a causal
connection between a misrepresentation in a proxy statement and injury to stockholders based
solely on a finding that the misrepresentation was material. Defendants owned more than a majority of the stock but still needed to solicit proxies to gain the requisite votes. Although the
reasoning of Justice Harlan proceeds along the same path as Judge Dooling in Laurenzano, the
Court did not have to, and did not, embrace Laurenzano and overrule cases to the contrary. 396
U.S. at 385 n.7.
19. The use of disclosure as a tool to elevate corporate standards is a legitimate concern of
the SEC. William L. Cary, former Chairman of the SEC, advocated the use of disclosure for this
purpose, See Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CAL. L. REV. 408, 411 (1962) ("In other
words, disclosure restrains because of sensitivity to public reaction, caution about response to the
'dissident' shareholder, and the possibility of legal action.") The SEC confirmed this view in its
response to the report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure. SEC Securities Act
Release No. 33-5906 (Feb. 15, 1978), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REV. (CCH) 81,505, at 80,047-48.
20. Scholars have urged the Commission to use its disclosure powers to pursue social objectives, such as environmental protection. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate
Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 565 (1972); Branson, Progress in the Art
of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 VAND. L.
REV. 529 (1976); Sonde and Pitt, Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to "Clear the Air! Clean the Sky!

Wash the Wind!, 16 How. L.J. 831 (1971).
The Commission has been wary about using disclosure for such purposes, however, and has
somewhat casually refused to adopt rules in the environmental protection area. Judge Richey,
however, ordered the Commission to hold hearings or make more careful findings in this area.
See Natural Resources Defense Council v, SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974). After lengthy
hearings, the Commission proposed modest rules, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656 (1975), which it modified
still further in the final version. 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632 (1976). On appeal, Judge Richey held that
the Commission's refusal to adopt rules was arbitrary and capricious and remanded the matter
for further consideration. Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C.
1977). An appeal has been taken by the Commission.
21.

A concern for the public interest is too broad to sustain the Commission's interest. See

NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
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primarily to influence corporate behavior.2 2 When it has used disclosure to
promote these regulatory objectives, as in the recent instances where it required disclosure of illegal and questionable payments by corporations, controversy has centered on whether the information was of concern to investors .23
We do not conclude from this background that the SEC should adopt
disclosure rules that have no potential for informing investors. But the Commission should not shrink from adopting disclosure rules for the explicit purpose of influencing corporate conduct where that conduct is of legitimate
concern to the Commission and where the information to be disclosed is rel24
evant to decisionmaking by investors.
B.

The Need to Strengthen Boards of Directors

We turn next to the question whether the SEC should use disclosure for
the regulatory purpose of improving the performance of boards of directors
of registered companies. This inquiry raises three subsidiary questions: Is
there a constructive role in a corporation that can best be played by a board
of directors? Can we determine what kinds of boards are capable of playing
that role? Are boards now failing to play that role? We conclude that the answer
to all three questions is yes, thereby establishing a policy basis for SEC regulatory intervention to strengthen boards of directors.
1. The Importance of the Board
We start with the premise that the principal underlying purpose of the
securities laws was and is to strengthen the basic institutions of the American

22. Examples of this are disclosure requirements concerning transactions between management and a corporation, see items 11(a) (promoter's transactions), 17 (remuneration of officers
and directors), and 20 (transactions between management and the registrant) of form S-I and
item 7 of regulation 14A; disclosure intended to discourage illegal corporate political contributions and other questionable payments, see proposed rule 13b-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-13185, 11 SEC DOCKET No. 8, at 1505 (Jan.
19, 1977) and Release No. 33-5466, 3 SEC DOCKET No. 18, at 647 (March 8, 1974) (disclosure of
illegal political contributions; and disclosure designed to strengthen the position of public accountants in relation to corporate managements, see item 4, form 8-K (change of certifying accountants)), SEC Accounting Series Release No. 165, [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,189.
23. Commissioners have expressed recognition that one of the main accomplishments of the
so-called management fraud programs directed against illegal or questionable payments has been
to influence corporate conduct. See Truth or Consequences, Address by John Evans, SEC Commissioner, before Securities Cooperative Enforcement Conference, Denver, Colo., at 12 (May 15,
1975); Disclosure and Corporate Management, Address by Ray Garrett, Chairman of the SEC,
before the Wharton Graduate Business School Club and Harvard Business School Club, New
York, N.Y. (April 14, 1975); Address by Roderick Hills, Chairman of the SEC, before the New
York Law Journal, New York, N.Y., at 11, (June 30, 1976); See also Stevenson, The SEC and the New
Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 92 (1976).
24. This view is consistent with the recommendations of the SEC Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure. See Digest of Report, 427 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-1 and separate
statement of Elliott J. Weiss, E-14. (Mr. Weiss was a member of the Advisory Committee.)
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capitalist economic system. Publicly held corporations, probably the most important of those institutions, are strengthened if they operate more efficiently
and if those who control them are viewed as doing so legitimately.
Some would argue that market forces and state corporate laws assure the
efficiency of corporations and provide them with legitimacy, so that no intervention by the federal government is required. 25 We dispute those contentions.
Despite the existence of a number of market devices that theoretically
promote efficiency, market forces do not adequately control the conduct of
corporations. Two principal market regulators are in operation: the capital
market, where investors function, and the product market, where consumers
function. In the first investors may eliminate inefficiency by causing a change
in the control of a corporation or denying it needed capital; in the second
inefficiency may be eliminated by business failure. Both reactions are extreme, and both suffer from the defect that substantial slack is tolerated before inefficiency is corrected.
The mechanisms available in the capital market to change corporate
control-the takeover bid and the proxy contest-are costly to mount and
uncertain of success, especially if management's incompetence is less than
total.2 6 In many cases the disciplinary effect of investors' decisions to withhold
capital is minimal because the firms can meet their needs with internally generated funds. 2 7 Investors also experience great difficulty in using a less drastic
remedy-imposing personal liability on management for its failings-because
of the broad protection furnished to management by the business-judgment
rule.
In the product market the ultimate penalty of insolvency is reserved for
the most inefficient firms and imposed only after an extended period of inefficiency. To the extent that an inefficient firm enjoys a monopoly it can escape the control of the product market. Finally, because of the complexity of
the corporate structure and the fact that corporate activity is carried out by

25. The view that market forces adequately control the conduct of the corporation is largely
premised on the belief that the corporation is a profit maximizer or a profit "satisfier." See
Alchian, The Basis of Some Recent Advances in the Theory of Management of the Firm, 14 J. INDUS.
ECON. 30 (Nov. 1965), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 487 (H. Manne ed.
1975); Peterson, Corporate Control and Capitalism, Q.J. ECON., Feb. 1965, at 1. See Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1019, 1101 (1976). Substantial doubt
about profit maximization as the motivating force behind corporate action is expressed in J.

166-78 (1967).
26. Moreover, in recent years the takeover bid has been used more to acquire well-managed
companies whose stock is viewed as undervalued. See Metz, Babcock and Wilcox: A Battle that Shook
Wall Street Notions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1977, at 57.
27. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 440 (1962). Following a great rise in the dollar value of securities offered by issuers to the public in the 1960's
during the so-called hot issue days, the amount of securities offered by issuers to the public since
1969 has been relatively stable. See [1976] SEC ANN. REP. 42, at 199.
GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE
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lower level managers, the signals of the product market may not be transmitted to the senior managers who have the power and responsibility to react to
such stimuli. 28 Since the market does not provide an automatic assurance that

corporate goals will be pursued, we conclude that there is a need for organizational strategies directed towards that objective.
One potential role for a board of directors is as a disciplinary force within
a corporation. A board, given its legal authority within the firm and its potential access to information and resources, can ride herd on management more
effectively than any of the market devices, all of which are external to the
firm.
A second potential role for a board is to ensure that management is pursuing a coherent business strategy that is in tune with the corporation's external
as well as internal environment. Corporations are made up of people who
plan and deal with problems "in the context of an organization chart, a system of measurement and information and a system of managerial reward and
punishment that primarily reflects the short-run needs of day-to-day operations. '' 29 This emphasis on short-term results often leads to biases in planning and decisionmaking that are quite harmful to a company.3 0 The possibility of such biases is increased in most large corporations by their divisional
organization, which leads to evaluation of managers on the basis of short-run
economic and technical results 3 I and to the common modern practice of fre-

quently rotating executives to different jobs, which often increases the impor-

3
tance attached to short-run results.

2

In addition, management's tendency to measure performance on the basis
of short-term, objective standards often leads a firm to ignore the social impact of its operations, which is often difficult to measure. Environmental pollution most readily comes to mind. The corporate decisionmaker's interest in
achieving results that best promote his personal goals under the existing reward system often causes the corporation to generate more harmful pollution
in order to reduce measurable costs and increase measurable profits. 3 3 Thus,
as to this facet of corporate performance, market-oriented behavior is counterproductive, encouraging conduct which damages society as a whole.
Economist Robin Marris has observed that industrial societies "are increas28.

C.

STONE,

WHERE

RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES

THE

LAW

ENDS

201

(1975);

P.

DRUCKER,

MANAGEMENT:

TASKS,

623 (1974).

29. Bower, On the Amoral Organization, in

THE CORPORATE SOCIETY

178, 195 (R. Marris ed.

1974).
30.

Id.

31. R. ACKERMAN, THE SOCIAL CHALLENGE TO
described as "subgoal pursuit." 0. WILLIAMSON,
AN INQUIRY

BUSINESS (1975). This leads to the phenomenon
CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR:

INTO THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATION FORM ON ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOR

See C. STONE, supra note 28, at 46; cf. M.
32. See Bower, supra note 29.
33. Id.

MACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN

241-42 (1977).

47-52 (1970).
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ingly affected by 'externalities' . . . to such an extent that 'competitive' or

market-type systems of socio-economic organization can no longer even approximately tend to optimize social welfare. '34 A board can play an important
leadership role in developing and measuring implementation of organizational strategies that will enable a corporation to deal more effectively and
3
responsibly with these problems .
Some might argue that corporate chief executive officers (CEO) should be
charged with the task of coordinating and controlling the activities of senior
and middle managers to promote the best interests of their firms and that
board intervention is not necessary. But frequently the chief executive does
not play that role. Studies have found that most CEO's of large firms tend to
emphasize short-term goals that "they are single-mindedly, almost slavishly,
committed to achieving ...."36 Thus, it is the board that must counteract this
inclination; it best can serve as "a potent force in moderating the man' 37
agement's understandable internal interest in day-to-day achievement.
A board also can function to reduce the likelihood of unnecessary errors
by a corporation. Economist Kenneth J. Arrow, a Nobel laureate, defines errors as unnecessary "when the information [to deal with a problem] is available somewhere in the organization but not available to or not used by the
authority [i.e., management].1

38

39
Unnecessary error arises from

overload of the information and decision-making capacity of the authority
....[Moreover, the] efficiency loss due to informational overload is increased
by the tendency in that situation [for management] to filter information in
accordance with . . .[its] preconceptions. It is easier [for management] to un-

derstand and accept information congruent with previous beliefs than to
overcome cognitive dissonance.
To deal with these problems, which are common to all large organizations,
Arrow states that some agency of "responsibility" capable of correcting errors
must be created. However, the agency of responsibility should not so limit the
discretion of the authority or become so involved in operating decisions that it
destroys "the genuine values of authority." 40 Within the corporate context a
boardlike entity clearly is best suited to serving the responsibility functions
described by Arrow.
Finally, a board can serve to provide legitimacy to a corporation, particularly if it demonstrates that it in fact imposes accountability on management.
34. Marris, Conclusion, in R. MARRIS, supra note 29.
35. See Andrews, Can the Best Corporationbe Made Moral?, 51 HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1973,
at 57-64.
36. Argyris, The CEO's Behavior: Key to Organizational Development, 51 HARV. Bus. REV.,
March-April 1973, at 55, 57.
37. Andrews, supra note 35.
38.

K.

ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 74 (1974).

39. Id. at 74-5.
40. Id. at 79.
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The problem of corporate legitimacy has been discussed in many contexts,
but perhaps never so cogently as by Professor Edward S. Mason in his introduction to The Corporation in Modern Society: '
[W]e are all aware that we live not only in a corporate society but a society of
large corporations. The management-that is, the control-of these corporations is in the hands of, at most, a few thousand men. Who selected these
men, if not to rule over us, at least to exercise vast authority, and to whom
are they responsible? The answer to the first question is quite clearly: they
selected themselves. The answer to the second is, at best, nebulous. This, in a
nutshell, constitutes the problem of legitimacy.

2.

A Role for the Board

Having described functions that can best-or only-be performed by a
board of directors does not answer the second of our questions: What kind of
board can in fact perform those functions? This question is far from unimportant; one can trace more than forty years of scholarly writing expressing
confusion about the proper role of a board and describing the failure of
boards to perform various important functions, but not addressing the ques42
tion of what sort of board could perform them.
But now the situation has changed. A consensus has developed in recent
years in support of one model for boards that if adopted could perform the
functions we have urged. 43 The model is of a board with a majority of part41. THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 5 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
42. Typical of this body of literature is the observation by Peter Drucker that "In reality the
board as conceived by the lawmaker is at best a tired fiction. It is perhaps not too much to say
that it has become a shadow king. In most of the large companies, it has in effect been deposed
and its place taken by executive management." P. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 178
(1954); see also R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 143-45 (1945).
Naturally, there were numerous proposals for change of the board. Some suggested that the
membership be redrawn to include representatives of various constituencies, such as employees,
consumers, or social activists, see Interview with Ralph Nader, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1971, § 3, at
9, col. 2; others suggested the employment of professional directors, see Townsend, Let's Install
Public Directors, Bus & Soc'Y REV. Spring 1972, at 69, a suggestion that had been advanced earlier
by Justice Douglas when he was chairman of the SEC, see W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE,
52-3 (1940); others asked boards to professionalize themselves by creating special staffs for outside directors, see Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1972, § 3, at 1, col 3.
See generally THE CONFERENCE

BOARD,

THE

BOARD

OF

DIRECTORS:

NEW

CHALLENGES,

NEW

(1972) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE BOARD 1972 REPORT].
43. One can argue, quite convincingly, that until recently the Commission should have declined to impose disclosure requirements relating to boards because neither it nor anyone else
had a clear idea of what constituted a properly functioning board of directors. When Congress
adopted the securities laws it tacitly adopted the governance scheme of the corporation statutes
which provided that "The business of every corporation . . . shall be managed by a Board of
Directors . . ." GEN. CORP. L. OF DEL., § 9 (Ch. 65, 1935 Code). Little attention was paid in the
1930's to what that statutory mandate meant and practically no consideration was given to the
board as an institution. See Weinberg, A Corporation Director Looks at His Job, 27 HARV. Bus. REV.
585, 587 (1949). The statutory mandates were apparently relics from the time the prototype
corporation was family owned and directors, executives, and principal stockholders were the
same. See Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934).
The position that no one has a clear idea of what constitutes a properly functioning board of
directors is untenable today. See notes 42-50 infra and accompanying text.
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44
The printime directors who are completely independent of management.
cipal function of this board is not the traditional one of managing the business of the corporation but the more modest, but indispensible, one of
45
monitoring management's performance.
The monitoring function of the board was first stressed by Professor Mel46
vin Aron Eisenberg:

A corporate organ comprised in significant part of nonexecutives can rarely
There
either manage the corporation's business or make business policy ....
is, however, one cluster of critical functions which such an organ is optimally
suited to perform: selecting, monitoring, and removing the members of the
chief executive's office. It therefore follows that the primary objective of the
legal rules governing the structure of corporate management should be to
ensure effective performance of that cluster of functions-if possible, without
precluding the board from playing additional roles if it so chooses.
Professor Eisenberg concluded that the "major effect of according the
policymaking function central importance, therefore, has been to divert legal
and corporate institutions from implementing a function that is both critical
and achievable: monitoring. ' ' 4 7 He also stressed that for monitoring to be effective, a majority of a board should be independent of management.
The concept of the monitoring board has received support from many
quarters. The Model Business Corporation Act and several state statutes have
been amended to provide that "the business and affairs of a corporation shall
be managed under the direction of, a board of directors . . .- 48 The draftsman
49
of the model act explained in the official comment:
Many commentators have recently voiced concern that [the language requiring that the business be managed by the board of directors] may be interpreted to mean that directors must become involved in the detailed administration of the corporation's affairs. Before the advent of the so-called
"outside" director, it was not unreasonable to expect the board to be actively
involved in the corporation's business; however, with the development of
board participation by individuals not otherwise actively involved with the
corporation, any such expectation can no longer be viewed to be reasonable.
Indeed, such involvement is clearly neither practical nor feasible insofar as
44. Most observers agree that the board should be composed predominantly of persons who
are independent of management. See generally C. BROWN, PUTTING THE CORPORATE BOARD TO
WORK (1976) (major theme is independence of the board). Movement in this direction has occurred as most boards are now composed of mainly nonemployees. See J. BACON, CORPORATE
DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: MEMBERSHIP AND COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD 3 (1973). A later study

confirms the trend and forecasts its continuation. See Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., The Changing
Board: Profile of the Board of Directors (1977).
45. The board's independence and its monitoring function are closely related: indeed, a
board will not succeed in monitoring unless it is independent.
46. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation:Officers, Directors
and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 402-3 (1975).

47.
48.

Id. at 438.
E.g., ABA-ALI

49.

ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws, Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct, 30 Bus. LAW.

501, 504-5 (1975).

MODEL

Bus.

CORP. ACT

§ 35 (Supp. 1977).
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today's complex corporation, other than perhaps the closely-held corporation,
To adapt to current corporate life the revision provides
is concerned ....
that the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of a board of directors.
A special subcommittee of the American Bar Association's Committee on
Corporate Laws, which issued a Corporate Director's Guidebook in November,
1976,50 interpreted the Model Business Corporation Act as placing responsibility on directors to establish basic corporate objectives, to select senior executives,
to ensure the recruitment of competent managers, and to monitor the performance of the enterprise and its managers. 5t The subcommittee also recommended that a majority of a board be persons independent of manage52
ment in order to ensure the integrity of the monitoring function.
Professors Noyes E. Leech and Robert H. Mundheim, in an extensive
study of outside directors' responsibilities, agreed that monitoring was the
central role for outside directors and suggested that statutory requirements
for mutual fund directors provide a model. 53 In enacting the Investment
Company Act of 194054 Congress decided that stockholders could be protected by independent directors who would monitor the relationship between
55
a fund and its management.
50. Subcomm. on Functions & Responsibilities of Directors of the A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32
Bus. LAW. 5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Director's Guidebook].
51. Id. at 20.
52. Id. at 33-35. Another ABA group, The Committee on Corporate Law Departments (composed entirely of inside corporate counsel) has attacked almost every major recommendation of
the subcommittee. Report of the Committee on Corporate Law Departments On Corporate Directors
Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 1841 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Guidebook Report]. They contend that
the recommendations are not required by law and they conflict with sound policy, at least as a
universal model. Insofar as the Law Department Committee opposes recommendations favoring a
majority of independent directors, and audit and nominating committees composed only of independent directors, it seems to be fighting a distinctly rear guard resistance against a developing
trend. The Law Department Committee does correctly point out that the Guidebook is not an
official ABA statement and, true to its title, it is a guidebook, not a model statute.
53. Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW.
1799, 1804 (1976).
54. Conflicts of interest were inherent in the mutual fund industry when Congress adopted
the Act. Funds were managed by outside companies that contracted with the fund, acting
through its board of directors, to provide investment advisory services. The selection of the investment advisor and the determination of the fee were self-dealing transactions that could neglect the stockholders' interests.
55. Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 182-3 (1971).
The Act sought to achieve these objectives by requiring that at least forty per cent of the board
consist of persons who are neither officers nor employees of the fund and who are "unaffiliated"
with its investment advisors. Investment Co. Act of 1940, § 10(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-10(a) (1970)). The SEC concluded in its 1966 mutual fund report, however, that unaffiliated directors, particularly as defined in the statute, had failed to provide the necessary protection for stockholders. The Congressional solution was to substitute the broader notion of "interested person" for the narrower definition of "affiliated persons." "Interested person" is defined in the statute so as to exclude from the category of independent directors more than just
officers, directors, five-per-cent stockholders, and controlling persons. Those persons are defined
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The courts have given emphasis to these objectives. Management has been
held to have violated its fiduciary duty to stockholders by not informing disinterested directors of an opportunity to reduce advisory fees. 56 The decision of
independent directors concerning an advisory contract and management fee
has been accorded the benefits of the business-judgment rule, but only when
it was a fully informed exercise of judgment. 57 Independent directors may
not escape liability just because they relied on opinions of counsel if that reliance appears to be unjustified under all the circumstances. 58
While the analogy between the boards of mutual funds and those of other
publicly held companies cannot be drawn too closely,5 9 the mutual fund experience demonstrates an acceptance of the monitoring function by independent directors. Moreover, judicial experience under the Investment Company
Act indicates that the courts are able to work with the concept of a monitoring board.
The SEC, too, has demonstrated its support for the concept of the independent monitoring board, though the Commission has demonstrated less
concern for the contribution a board might make to the efficiency of management than for the way in which such a board can enhance corporate compliance with the reporting and disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.

6

1

as affiliated and, consequently, interested. But, "interested" also includes their close relatives,
lawyers for the fund, broker-dealers, and persons whom the Commission shall have determined
to be interested by reason of having had a material business or professional relationship with the
fund and certain other persons. Section 2(a)(19) defines "interested person" and the concept is
carried into §§ 10(a) and 15(c) of the Act.
56. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
57. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1977).
58. Papilsky v. Berndt, [1976-77 Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,627 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
59. This is because there is little else except monitoring that is appropriate or necessary for
outside directors of a mutual fund. Directors of most mutual funds have little to do, as the fund
is generally externally managed. Conflicts of interest between management and stockholders almost invariably exist, requiring special attention by outside directors. The business of the fund is
not complex and many of the fund's activities are regulated by statute. See generally Mundheim,
Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 1058 (1967).
60. The SEC's recent expression of interest dates from the bankruptcy of the Penn Central
Co. and was followed by a more general interest in the role of directors. See STAFF OF THE SEC,
THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY, Report to the Special Subcomm. on
Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
152 (Subcomm. Print 1972) (SEC staff finds Penn Central board failed "to effectively monitor
management"); Address of G. Bradford Cook, Chairman of the SEC, reprinted as Speech on
Director's Responsibilities, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,301 (announces
preparation of SEC guidelines on the responsibilities of corporate directors); What the SEC Expects of Corporate Directors, Address by Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the SEC, before the
Arthur D. Little Corporate Directors Conference, Wash., D.C. (Dec. 17, 1974) (SEC abandons
preparation of guidelines due to inability to specify directors' responsibilities in every possible
situation; in a common-law approach, SEC urges director to "do his duty").
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Roderick M. Hills, while SEC chairman, noted that these are important
61
roles to be played by a monitoring board. He said:
Management is too often complacent, self-perpetuating, and unresponsible.
When reported profits decline to such an extent as to threaten the serenity of
their well paid isolation, some managers are tempted to change the accounting, the figures or the morals of their company in order to present a more
pleasing profit picture....
Effective, responsive, and responsible boards of directors will operate to pre-

vent management from going this route, he continued, while boards that are
"missing . . . a truly independent character that has the practical capacity to
monitor and to change management" will not.
Chairman Hills and other members of the SEC have stressed that by ensuring the integrity of corporate reports, the board can provide valuable protection for investors. 62 The Commission, as a body, emphasized this in its

Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corporation Relating to the
Activities of the Directors of Stirling Homex Corporation,63 where it took to task two
outside directors of Stirling Homex for failing to discover that management
64
had been deceiving both them and the investing public.

However, probably the most important assertion of the SEC's views about
the importance of boards has been in enforcement proceedings brought by
the Commission.6 5 In a wide variety of cases ranging from conventional fail-

ures to furnish adequate information to the more celebrated incidents of illegal political contributions and foreign payoffs, the Commission has perceived that the best remedy to a problem lay in providing for a more effective
board .66
61. Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 301-07 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] (remarks of Roderick M.
Hills).
62. An independent board is likely to view ensuring the accuracy of corporate financial reports and other disclosure documents as one of its principal obligations. See Gould v. AmericanHawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3rd Cir. 1976); Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
63. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11516, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)
80,219.
64. The board of Stirling Homex was a particularly passive one. The Commission noted that
only seven meetings were held over two years, most of which were perfunctory and several of
which were conducted by telephone; that the only committee was an executive committee composed entirely of inside directors, and that no written agenda or memorandums were furnished
to assist the board in its functions.
The Commission concluded that the two outside directors "did not provide the shareholders
with any significant protection in fact, nor did their presence on the Board have the impact upon
the company's operations which shareholders and others might reasonably have expected." Id.
65. The Commission has no power to impose substantive changes in the makeup or operations of the boards of registered corporations. Although the Commission has attempted to make
limited changes in registrants' boards by seeking ancillary relief in judicial proceedings, its power
in this regard has not been tested judicially. See Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement
Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1975); Comment, Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in
Federal Securities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEo. L.J. 737 (1976).
66. In its report to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, the Commis-
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67
The most important of these actions, in our view, was SEC v. Mattel, Inc.,
which involved the filing of false financial statements. The SEC negotiated a
consent decree whereby, in effect, it caused a sweeping change in the man-

agement of the company. The company agreed to name a majority of unaffiliated directors satisfactory to the SEC, to maintain an executive committee
with a majority of unaffiliated directors, to create a financial controls and
audit committee and a litigation and claims committee consisting mainly or
wholly of unaffiliated directors, and to have special counsel designated by a
68
majority of the new directors.
This was a deep intrusion into corporate governance, with vast potential
significance. 69 The significance of Mattel does not revolve about whether the
relief was justified or even whether such sweeping ancillary relief was authorized. It revolves about the SEC's judgment that the way to deal with a
problem in the management of a corporation was to create an independent
monitoring board, even if this meant that the usual legal procedures under
state law for selecting directors were swept aside. Since Mattel the SEC has
continued to seek similar remedies for numerous other kinds of management
dysfunction 70 both to correct noncompliance with the law and to reform the
sion observed that "corporate accountability can be strengthened by making the role of the board
of directors more meaningful .... " Commenting on the remedies that had been obtained in the
cases, the SEC found "the thoroughness and vigor with which these [audit] committees have
conducted their investigations demonstrates the importance of enhancing the role of the board of
directors, establishing entirely independent audit committees as permanent, rather than extraordinary, corporate organs and encouraging the Board to rely on independent counsel." SECURITIES
AND

EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND

ILLEGAL PAYMENTS

AND PRACTICES,

submitted to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
68 (May 12, 1976); see also SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN

COMMERCE

COMM.,

95TH

CONG.,

2D

SESS.,

FEDERAL

REGULATION

AND

REGULATORY

34-35 (Comm. print 1976). Private litigation in questionable payment cases has reflected
this perception. See, e.g., Gilbar v. Keeler, 75 Civ. Action No. 611-EAC (C.D. Cal. 1975) (settleREFORM

ment required majority of "independent outside directors" on the board, its audit committee, and
its nominating committee through amendment of bylaws); see also Springer v. Jones, 74 Civ. Action No. 1455-F (C.D. Cal. 1975).
67. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,754 (D.D.C. 1974).
68. See also SEC v. VTR, Inc., [1966] SEC ANN. REP. 32, at 116-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (though
SEC sought appointment of receiver, court directs controlling group to elect four independent
directors to a five-member board to supervise filing of accurate reports); SEC v. Coastal States
Gas Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (S.D. Tex.), 2 SEC DOCKET No. 13, at 451 (Sept. 25,
1973); SEC v. Westgate-California Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6142 (S.D. Cal. 1973), 3
SEC DOCKET No. 1, at 30.
69. Malley, Far-Reaching Equitable Remedies Under The Securities Acts and the Growth of Federal
Corporate Law, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47 (1975); Ruder, Current Problems in Corporate Disclosure,
30 Bus. LAW. 1081, 1084 (1975).
70. SEC v. Allied Chemical Corp., 77 Civ. Action No. 0373 (D.D.C. 1977) (company agreed to
investigate environmental risk and to take appropriate action based on that investigation); SECv.
Ormand Industries, Inc., 77 Civ. Action No. 0790 (D.D.C. 1977) (settlement required company to
appoint three additional directors satisfactory to the SEC, who were unaffiliated with the company and who would remain on the board for three years); SEC v. General Tire & Rubber Co.,
76 Civ. Action No. 0799, (D.D.C. 1976) (company agreed to create a special review committee
consisting of five outside directors, with special counsel, to conduct an investigation into unlawful
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structure of the subject companies' boards of directors. 71
The monitoring board envisioned by Eisenberg, by the ABA subcommittee, by Leech and Mundheim, and by the SEC, we believe, has the potential to
fulfill each of the important board functions described above. 72 Clearly, with
its emphasis on monitoring, it would be able to play the disciplinary role.
Removed from day-to-day management and from pressures for short-term
results, it would be in a better position than management to question whether
short-run performance was congruent with long-range corporate goals. Similarly, because the board would be subject to less intense and exhaustive pressures than management, it would be well situated to assist management in
dealing with some of the problems of information overload identified by Professor Arrow. Finally, at least to the extent that the board demonstrated its
independence from management and its commitment to hold management
accountable, the monitoring board could substantially enhance the legitimacy
of the corporation.
3.

Are Boards Failingto Act as Independent Monitors?

We come, then, to our third subsidiary question: Are boards failing to act
as independent, effective monitors of management's performance? We believe
many corporate boards are not performing in the desired fashion.
As we will point out below, relatively few data exist about what boards
actually do, so any conclusion on this point must be somewhat impressionistic.
But our conclusion is supported by one of the most thorough field investigations of boards of directors, which was completed by Professor Myles Mace in
1971. In a book provocatively titled Directors: Myth and Reality, 73 Professor
Mace described a situation in which most directors serve as passive, friendly

political activities and related matters); SEC v. Sanitas Corp., 75 Civ. Action No. 0520 (D.D.C.
1975) (settlement required the company to maintain audit and legal committees, each composed
of outside directors, and each with broad powers). See Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1977, at 8, col. I
(settlement with Zale Corp. requires extensive board reform).
These enforcement actions represent important substantive intrusions into corporate affairs.
See generally Note, Bribes, Kickbacks, and Political Contributions in Foreign Countries--he Nature and
Scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Power to Regulate and Control American Corporate
Behavior, 1976 Wisc. L. REv. 1231, 1261. But cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292

(1977).
71. Two SEC enforcement attorneys have written that by employing ancillary remedies "the
Commission acts as an effective catalyst for corporate reform to a far greater extent than would
be possible solely by the use of its own budgetary and manpower resources." Herlihy & Levine,
Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 547, 581 (1976).

For a civil suit in which the SEC attempted to impose its concept of directors' obligations, see
SEC v. Penn Central Co., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,527 (E.D. Pa.
1974); Note, Penn Central: A Case Study of Outside Director Responsibility Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 45 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 394 (1977). See also SEC v. Shiell, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 96,190 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
72. See notes 29-41 supra and accompanying text.
73. M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971).
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advisors to management but rarely ask penetrating questions or attempt to
evaluate management's performance critically. In recent testimony before the
SEC Professor Mace indicated that he does not believe the situation has
74
changed dramatically since he completed his study.
Professor Mace's conclusion is supported by other data and other observers. In many recent cases involving so-called unusual corporate payments,
for example, it has been clear that the boards of directors of the companies
that made those payments were completely unaware of the questionable
75
means being used to facilitate a large portion of the companies' business.

Surveys conducted by management consulting firms and by the Conference
Board indicate that there is a remarkable diversity in how boards conceive of
their roles and carry out their functions, with some substantial proportion of
all boards operating rather ineffectively.
Thus, in our view, there is no doubt but that there is a widespread failure
of boards to function as independent monitors of management performance.
Constructive intervention by the SEC could lead to a marked improvement in
the effectiveness of many corporations' boards of directors.
C.

The Importance of Information About Boards

As we noted above, it is generally agreed that before the SEC can adopt
disclosure requirements designed to influence corporate conduct it must determine that the information to be disclosed is of material importance to
investors. 76 Disclosure requirements intended to promote more effective
boards of directors will cause corporations to reveal information that should
allow investors to determine what role a board plays within a corporation.
That information, in our view, is material to both investment and corporate
suffrage decisionmaking.
1. Investment Decisions
Information about the operations of a board is important to investors because the effectiveness of the board of directors can be an important element
in an assessment of the quality of management of a corporation, and quality
77
of management is a key element in investment decisions.

74.

SEC Hearings on Corporate Suffrage, Washington, D.C., (Sept. 30, 1977) (statement of

M. L. Mace).
75. SECURITIES

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 66, at 93-112.
76. In making that determination, though, the Commission can use its expertise to decide
what information should be important to investors, as well as reviewing what information investors say is important to them. See SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, REPORT TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, submitted to the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Chap. VIII (Comm. Print 1977).

77.

A recent survey of individual investors' use of information, conducted by the SEC, found

that information about the quality of a company's management was rated "extremely useful" by
more respondents (54%) than any data except the future economic outlook of the industry of
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The Commission acknowledged this point explicitly in Matter of Franchard
7 9
s
Corporation,7 where it stated:
Evaluation of the quality of management-to whatever extent it is possible-is
an essential ingredient of informed investment decision. A need so important
cannot be ignored, and in a variety of ways the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act furnish factual information to fill this need.
However, at the time of Franchard and today the disclosure requirements
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act did not and do not provide investors with nearly enough information to assess the performance of individual
directors or the role played by the board within a corporation.

2.

Voting Decisions

Information that will allow shareholders to assess the performance of individual directors and of the board as a group is also material to shareholders'
voting decisions. In fact, it seems likely that the SEC, by its failure to require
more meaningful disclosure about boards of directors, has undermined the
concept of fair corporate suffrage that the 1934 Act was designed to promote.
The contribution corporate suffrage (in the sense described by Professor
Ripley) can make to the efficient operation of a corporation, and the manner
in which the SEC's inadequate disclosure requirements have undermined corporate suffrage, are best understood through the work of Professor Albert 0.
Hirschman, an economist. In Exit, Voice and Loyalty8 Professor Hirschman
points out that when an organization is operating at less than peak efficiency
(as almost all large organizations do), some combination of "exit"-selling
one's stock-and "voice"-attempting to influence the organization's conduct-probably will lead to the greatest possible increase in efficiency. However, Professor Hirschman states, people's willingness to rely on voice depends heavily on their estimates of the prospects for success, and" l
while exit requires nothing but a clearcut either-or decision, voice is essentially
an art constantly evolving in new directions. This situation makes for an important bias in favor of exit when both options are present: customermembers [or stockholders] will ordinarily base their decisions on past experience with the cost and effectiveness of voice even though the possible

which the company is a part. (Only 50% rated financial-statement information extremely useful.)
Yet information about the quality of management was said to be inaccessible by more respondents than was any other information, with one third of all those who thought it moderately or
very useful characterizing it as inaccessible. SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DisCLOSURE, supra note 76, Survey of Individual Investor Opinion, Questions 3(a) and (b).
78. 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964) (Commission rejects staff recommendation that disclosure be found
defective because it failed to mention inadequacy of board of directors' performance; rejection
due to Commission view that such finding would require determination of board's adequacy
under state law; decision does not deny investors' interest in obtaining information about board).
79. Id. at 169-71.
80. A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
81. Id. at 43 (emphasis in original).
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discovery of lower cost and greater effectiveness is of the very essence of voice.
The presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice.
This analysis demonstrates not only why the "Wall Street rule" (vote with
management or sell) is a popular choice for investors but also why it is
unsatisfactory. 82 Professor Hirschman's argument supports the notion that
voice, that is, stockholder participation, is necessary to the health of a corporation. Exit is a blunt instrument; voice is needed for finely tuned attempts to
deal with defects in an organization.
Professor Hirschman's analysis also indicates how the effectiveness of voice
is enhanced by an improved disclosure process. Disclosure will lower the costs
of attempting to use voice. Since a stockholder in a corporation rarely stands
to obtain enough direct benefits from attempts to improve corporate governance to make the endeavor profitable to him, costs are a matter of great
concern.83 If one makes them low enough, in absolute terms, by ensuring that
adequate information is readily available to interested shareholders, reliance
on voice--or increased shareholder attention to corporate governance-is
84
likely to increase.
Finally, Professor Hirschman's work makes clear why SEC intervention is
needed to facilitate corporate suffrage. Hirschman notes that the management of an organization will try to direct its critics to the pressure mechanism
to which it is less sensitive, because "the short-run interest of management in
organizations is to increase its own freedom of movement .... ,,85
In the case
of large corporations, management usually is not as sensitive to stock sales by
disenchanted stockholders as it is to activism on the part of those stockholders. Consequently, management will encourage use of exit and intervention by some third party will be necessary to encourage a better balance between the use of exit and of voice.
82. In light of Hirschman's analysis of why voice tends to fall into desuetude, it is not surprising that investors in general are not clamoring for changes in the proxy rules to allow for more
shareholder participation in corporate affairs. The SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, which surveyed both institutional and individual investors, found little active demand for
proxy rule changes. SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, Draft of Final Report,

Ch. XXIV, at 27-30 (1977).
83. This is a classic positive externality situation-one in which not enough of a social good
(here, improved corporate performance) is produced because no individual who can produce the

good can capture more than a small share of the benefits from his action. See A.

ALCHIAN

& W.

249-50 (1969).
84. The experience of institutional investors who used the services of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) is illustrative. The cost to each institution of learning enough about
social issues affecting portfolio corporations was high enough to deter them from dealing with
those issues. But when IRRC began to make that information available at a much lower cost to
each institution, many of them found that the cost of becoming an active shareholder was low
enough to warrant pursuing that course of action. See Schwartz & Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC
Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 648 (1977).
85. See A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 75, at 123.
ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: THEORY IN USE
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The Case for a Disclosure Approach

While the SEC has relied heavily on the concept of the monitoring board
in its enforcement program, it has made little use of its disclosure authority
either to encourage the development of independent monitoring boards or to
elicit information about boards that is of considerable importance to investors.
We have outlined above the reasons why the Commission should seek to attain both of these objectives. We elaborate here our reasons for believing that
disclosure is particularly well suited to achieving these goals. It is time, we
believe, to move from the pathological remedy of enforcement proceedings to
the prescriptive treatment of improved disclosure.
1. Current Disclosure Requirements
The SEC currently requires disclosure of relatively little information about
corporations' boards of directors. Its initial proxy rules, adopted in 1935,86
called for no information about boards or candidates for election as directors.
In 1938, the Commission adopted regulation 14A, the present designation of
the proxy rules, requiring information to be sent to stockholders in a proxy
statement. 87 The facts required about directors were sparse: the number of
shares in the corporation owned by each director, the relationship of any director with the firm's underwriter, and the identity of any person or body
which had nominated a candidate for election to the board.
In the ensuing years, despite periodic revisions of the proxy rules, little
additional information has been elicited about boards or individual directors. 88 More information about remuneration of directors, their transactions

with the issuer, and their prior experience has been demanded, but most of
the data sought is rudimentary and relates primarily to conflicts of interest.
The Commission now has pending a rule change, proposed on November
2, 1976, to require some additional disclosure about directors and candidates
for election as directors, including information about their membership on
board committees, other directorships held, family relationships with other
directors and officers, and whether the director or candidate is subject to

86. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-378, (Sept. 24, 1935).
87. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-1823, (Aug. 11, 1938).
88. Subject to limitations of the First Amendment, which extend to some aspects of commercial speech, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976), the Commission's authority to adopt rules under 14(a) is quite broad. It is not even
limited to ensuring full disclosure. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 868 (2d ed. 1961). When
the stockholder proposal rule was adopted in 1942, the reaction on the part of a few members of
Congress was so hostile that it provoked the introductions of bills to suspend their effectiveness.
Hearings were held, but no action resulted. Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings].
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certain kinds of injunctions.8 9 The purpose of the amendments, according to
the Commission, is to provide more meaningful disclosure about management. However, the proposal adds no information to the proxy statement
about the functions of the board as a body and little about individual
directors' activities on the board.
In April 1977 the Commission acknowledged its inaction in this area in a
release announcing its first broad reexamination of the proxy rules since
1942.90 The Commission's action appears to have been stimulated in part by
controversy about its shareholder proposal rule 91 and in part by the work of
its Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure. The Advisory Committee
recommended that the SEC adopt "a package of disclosure requirements that,
taken as a whole, will strengthen the ability of boards of directors to operate
as independent effective monitors of management performance and will provide investors with a reasonable understanding of the organization and role of
the board of any given issuer." 92
It would be both desirable and appropriate for the Commission to use its
disclosure authority for the purpose of strengthening reporting companies'
boards of directors.
Moreover, disclosure is preferable to the obvious alternative-establishment of substantive rules governing the composition and organization
of boards of directors. 93 In light of the amount of experimentation and

89. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12946, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 80,783 (Nov. 2, 1976). The SEC's failure to meaningfully amend its proxy rules
runs the risk of contributing to what Professor Eisenberg calls the "quack-cure problem," which
he describes as "the danger that belief in the validity of the received legal model [of a board that
selects officers, sets policy, and generally manages the corporation's business] will forestall meaningful regulation by lulling shareholders, legislators, and the public into the illusion (which often
seems deliberately conjured-up) that a disinterested board is supervising the corporation's affairs." Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 384.
90. SEC Securities Exchange Act, Release No. 34-13482, 12 SEC DOCKET No. 2, at 239 (April
28, 1977).
91. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 84. The SEC first advanced the stockholder proposal
rule in 1942, House Hearings, supra note 88, at 34-36. Providing stockholders with access to
proxy statements for nomination of directors has received some scholarly support. Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Programfor Fair Corporate Suffrage, 39 VA. L. REV. 141 (1953);
Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1970); Note, A Proposal
for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Director in the Corporate Proxy Statement, 74 COLUM.
L. REV. 1139 (1974).

92. Minutes of meeting of SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure (May 7-8, 1977).
The recommendation was adopted by a vote of 8-7.
93. The Commission probably would have to obtain new legislative authority in order to enforce such standards. Cf. Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). However, there is
some Congressional support for having the SEC set substantive standards. In 1976, the investigations Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee issued a report calling on the SEC to
issue rules to assure that (a) a director of a publicly owned corporation receives compensation
and independent staff sufficient to perform responsibly his board duties; (b) a majority of the
board is independent of senior management and operating executives and from any other conflicts of interests; (c) the board reviews and approves the corporation's code of business conduct
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change occurring in corporate boards at this time, it would seem inadvisable,
at least under the prevailing federal system where most substantive power
over corporate affairs rests with state law, to lock all corporations into one
pattern of organization.

94

A major benefit of a disclosure approach to regulation is that it allows for
a diversity of responses. New disclosure requirements relating to boards of
directors should be designed to force all corporations to think through how
their boards should be constituted and what roles they should play, but there
is no reason to believe that all corporations will arrive at the same answers to
these questions. To be sure, corporations will feel pressure to arrive at answers that they can justify in their public statements, and in many instances
that pressure will cause change. But at the same time many corporations will
find in their particular circumstances reasons to deviate from the model suggested by the disclosure system. Consequently, a desirable diversity of board
practices should result. Even those urging more sweeping corporate reform95
must admit that this is a sound first step.
II
A

NEW DISCLOSURE SYSTEM

A.

Criteria for a System

It is a challenge to formulate disclosure requirements that will promote
independent monitoring boards by providing shareholders and investors with
information of substantial value. No small number of facts will demonstrate
that a corporation has an independent monitoring board. 96 Indeed, many aspects of a board's role-particularly its relationship with senior management-cannot be quantified.

and system of internal controls; (d) the board's auditing committee has available to it independent
expert advisors; and (e) the board has the authority to hire and fire the independent accountant,
legal counsel, the general counsel, and senior operating executives. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., supra note 66, at 52.
94. See Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 221 (remarks of Professor Mundheim) (legislation,
which is difficult to rescind, is inappropriate at a time of experimentation); Guidebook Report, supra
note 52, at 1843 (variety of corporate governance practices is desirable).
95. Schwartz, A Case for FederalChartering of Corporations,31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976).
96. The converse is not necessarily true. If a corporation's board is made up largely or entirely of inside directors who hold small amounts of stock in the corporation, it would be reasonable to infer that the board is not likely to serve as an effective independent monitor of
management's performance. See M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY Ch. 6 (1971); J. BACON
& J. BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION, AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE
BOARD 67 (1975). Similarly, while information that a board has certain characteristics will not
demonstrate dispositively that it is functioning effectively, disclosure that certain characteristics
are lacking will give rise to the inference that the board is not playing an effective role. For an
amusing', but realistic, illustration of how a CEO can foster the appearance that he has an effective board while actually emasculating the board, see Lauenstein, Preserving the Impotence of the
Board, 55 HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1977, at 36.
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However, as is now widely recognized, the difficulty of quantifying information should not preclude an SEC requirement for its disclosure. 97 Rather
disclosure requirements should be judged by their potential benefits and
costs.9" The benefits of effective boards have been discussed; the promotion
of such boards by means of disclosure requirements could bring these added
benefits: Shareholders and investors would better understand whether a corporation has an active, independent monitoring board, which bears on their
investment decisions. Secondly, shareholders and investors would have a
sound basis for comparing the activities and organization of different corporations' boards and for the use of "voice" to stimulate change where it seems
desirable. Thirdly, shareholders could better assess individual candidates in
board elections. They could also better analyze specific board recommendations on which they are asked to vote. Finally-and probably most important-all corporations subject to these disclosure requirements would feel
pressure to develop independent monitoring boards.
In our view, the Commission can attain these benefits through new disclosure requirements by drawing on the extensive recent literature on the
elements of board effectiveness. 99 At the same time, we recognize the constraints on any SEC effort to mandate new disclosures about registrants'
boards.
One such constraint is the need for confidentiality in boardroom deliberations. These deliberations must be confidential if a board is to discuss business
freely and affect it significantly. Confidentiality will be particularly important
in a board's relationship with its CEO, which may be delicate while the board
is first asserting itself but which is crucial to the board's ultimate effectiveness. 0 0 A chief executive unaccustomed to supervision may resist the board's
attempts to monitor him and may withhold information the board needs.' 0
97. The debate in this area has focused largely on disclosure of information relating to projections of earnings and business plans. See, e.g., Schneider, Nits, Grits and Soft Information in SEC
Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1972); Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some
Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151 (1970). The SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure
has urged the Commission to amend its rules to facilitate disclosure of considerably more "soft"
information, which the Committee has found often is of prime interest to investors. See
Memorandum from Mary E. T. Beach, Staff Director, to Members of the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure, Exhibits E-J (May 26, 1977) (on file with the authors) (hereinafter cited as
Beach Memo].
98. Beach Memo, supra note 97, Exhibit C.
99. The leading works are Eisenberg, supra note 46; Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53; Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 50; and C. BROWN, supra note 44.
100. Development of a board that effectively monitors management's performance does not
imply either board interference with management or the development of an adversary relationship between the board and management. "[A]II that the monitoring function implies is a willingness to be vigilant and questioning in an effort to determine what is in the best interests of the
corporation." Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1805.
101. Robert Haack, former president of the New York Stock Exchange and now a professional director, has commented that "if you, as a chief executive officer, knew about 80% more
than your average director-and in most cases it's 90%-it's very easy-not by any cupidity or any
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Placing such a board in a fishbowl may encourage directors' traditional pref0 2
erence for passivity and the CEO's attempts to retain autonomy.1
Another constraint lies in the purpose of disclosure, which is to provide
information pertinent to investment or voting decisions. 10 3 The disclosure system should not encourage shareholders to second-guess a board's or a management's business judgments. Thus, disclosure requirements should focus
on a board's organization and procedures rather than the substance of its decisions.

In addition, disclosure requirements should not drown shareholders in a
sea of minutiae. As a committee of the American Bar Association recently
noted, requiring more disclosure in proxy materials can be "a matter of diminishing returns. It is not only that the marginally useful disclosure items
will not be read, but they obscure and detract from those that are useful."'10 4
Disclosure requirements should therefore be limited to crucial items. If the
disclosure system is successful, it will encourage shareholders to interest themselves in corporate governance and thus to seek out the additional details. 0 5
A final constraint is that the Commission should require the disclosure of
meaningful information rather than empty jargon. Because some significant
information about boards is difficult to quantify, corporations may tend to
respond to disclosure requirements with "boilerplate"-formulaic statements
that convey little useful information and are drafted primarily to avoid liability for misrepresentation. The Commission can discourage this in public and
private; corporations and their counsel are not oblivious to this kind of exhortation. 0 6 Furthermore, the factors that have led to past reliance on boilerdeviousness, but by sheer emphasis or de-emphasis of a point-to persuade a board to your point
of view." Corporate Boards of Directors: A Time for Change?, Transcript, Investor Responsibility Research Center Conference (May 31-June 1, 1974) at 70. [hereinafter cited as IRRC Transscript].
102. See Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc., Shareholders, The Board of Directors
and Corporate Governance: Occidental Petroleum Corp., Analysis No. 3, Supp. No. 5, at 3-45,
3-49 (1975) (statement of Paul C. Hebner, vice president, secretary, and board member of Occidental Petroleum Corp.) (board discussions productive only if confidential).
103. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5627, 8 SEC DOCKET No. 2, at 20, 41 (Oct. 14, 1975).
104. Letter from Kenneth J. Bialkin, Chairman, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, American Bar Association, to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 14, 1976)
(SEC Public File No. 57-658).
105. Shareholders wishing to suggest changes in board procedures would probably be able to
put their proposals in a form that could be voted on by all shareholders, using the procedure set
out in rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. For a discussion of how shareholders
can make use of those procedures, see Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 84, at 635.
106. Several factors lie behind our judgment that the prognosis for a constructive corporate
response to the proposed disclosure requirements is good. The corporate community is under
widespread attack in the United States, and man), of its critics focus on the lack of an independent board as one of the factors that undermines the institutional legitimacy of the large, publicly
held corporation. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976). The business community is concerned by these attacks. One sign of that concern is the symposium that the Business Roundtable, an association of large corporations, recently sponsored concerning corporate
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plate may not be present in our proposal. In the past the SEC distrusted
imprecise and subjective information and conditioned its respondents to provide "hard" data and standard descriptions, no matter how meaningless.1" 7
Recently the Commission has modified this distrust and has required or encouraged the disclosure of certain kinds of "soft" information. 0 8 Despite the
difficulty the SEC has in ensuring the accuracy and adequacy of these data,
the results of these efforts have been moderately encouraging.10 9
Fear of civil liability under the SEC's antifraud rules has also encouraged
vacuous disclosure in the past. By requiring disclosure of the process and not
the substance of decisions, we would abate such fears. It should not require
excessive care for corporations to avoid misstatements about board processes.
Moreover, in uncontested elections the lack of a causal relationship between
misstatements and potential harm would remove virtually all threat of money
damages." 0 The threat of an injunction would remain, but it alone is not
likely to lead to timid responses to our proposed disclosure requirements."'
boards. RUDER, THE ROLE AND COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF A LARGE PUBLICLY
HELD CORPORATION (1977)

(report on a symposium of business school deans and others held at

the Harvard Business School, May 12-14, 1977) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD SYMPOSIUM].
See also The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the
Large Publicly Owned Corporation (Jan. 1978).
As Robert M. Estes, former general counsel of General Electric Co., has pointed out, businessmen must build on the differences in the role and responsibilities of the CEO and the directors
of a corporation if they "hope to avoid governmental imposition of measures of accountability
having a high disaster potential for the viability of the institution." Estes, The Case for Counsel to
Outside Directors, 54 HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1976, at 125, 127. The proposed rules, we believe, will provide concerned corporations and boards with a framework within which to highlight
steps they have taken to enhance the legitimacy of the board and of our current system of corporate governance. Participants in The Business Roundtable's symposium noted that by demonstrating the board's independence and its ability to provide meaningful scrutiny of corporate internal
affairs, some of the criticism of corporate operations may be met. HARVARD SYMPOSIuM, supra
at 16.
107. See Schneider, supra note 97; Kripke, A Search For a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy,
31 Bus. LAW. 293 (1975). Among the sections of the registration statement that have been most
susceptible to meaningless disclosures are the description of business (item 9 of Form S-1), particularly the part dealing with a description of competition, and the description of litigation (item
12 of Form S-1). The Commission attempted to cure that defect when it amended the guides for
preparing a registration statement in 1972. See New Appraches to Disclosure in Registered Security
Offerings, 28 Bus. LAW. 505, 522 (1973) (remarks of Warren Grienenberger). See also 160 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-3 (1972) (remarks of former SEC Chairman William Casey).
108. The Commission has revised rule 14(a)-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14(a)-9 (1977), to delete its
prohibition on dividend projections. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5699, 9 SEC DOCKET No.
10, at 471 (Apr. 23, 1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
109. The diversity of corporate responses to the requirements of Guide 22, which requires a
management discussion and analysis of the summary of operations, illustrates this point very well.
See H. GOODMAN & L. LORENSEN, ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS AND RELATED
MANAGEMENT DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS (1975); SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, Minutes of Meeting of Feb. 7-8, 1977, at 5 (on file with the authors).
110. Sisters of the Precious Blood Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
96,013 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Levy v. Johnson,
Lewis v. Elam, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Cf. Mills v. Electric
[1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Auto Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977).
111. Rafal v. Geneen, [1972] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,505 (E.D. Pa.).
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Proposed Disclosure Requirements

Set out below is proposed language for a set of additional SEC disclosure
requirements relating to elections of directors. While each requirement is designed to reveal information of particular significance, the individual requirements are not designed to be evaluated in isolation. Rather it is our intent that they be judged on whether they will contribute meaningful pieces to
a mosaic that, taken as a whole, will provide shareholders and investors with a
reasonable picture of the role the board of directors is playing within a corporation.
We propose that proxy statements issued prior to shareholders' meetings
at which directors are to be elected be required to disclose:
1.

Information About Individual Nominees

a. Identification of each nominee (and each other person whose term of
office as a director will continue after the election meeting) as a management, affiliated nonmanagement, or unaffiliated nonmanagement director and for each affiliated nonmanagement director, a statement of the
significant relationship with management that has caused him to be classified as affiliated.
b. The amount of director's fees paid to each nonmanagement director
during the previous fiscal year, including separate statements of annual
fees, meeting attendance fees, committee membership fees, and committee meeting attendance fees.
c. A tabulation of the number of board and committee meetings held
during the previous fiscal year, the total amount of time the board and
each committee was in session, and for each board member, the number
of board and committee meetings he attended and the total amount of
time he spent at board meetings and at meetings of each committee of
which he was a member.
d. A list of all other registrants on whose board each nominee serves.
2.

Information About Nominating Procedures

a. A brief description of the procedures used to select new nominees for
election as directors and to determine whether to renominate sitting directors.
b. A brief description of the criteria used to select new nominees for
election as directors and to determine whether to renominate sitting directors.
c. A statement whether the registrant's proxy materials have been reviewed and approved by the board of directors (or a committee of the
board) prior to their distribution to stockholders and whether the board
of directors (or a committee of the board) must specifically authorize or
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approve all expenditures in connection with management's proxy solicitation.

3.

Information About the Organization and Activities of the Board
a. A brief description of the authority and responsibilities of each standing committee of the board, including information about the frequency
with which and the procedure by which each committee reports to the
full board and the procedures used for selecting the members of each
committee.
b. A statement:
i. Whether board members regularly receive an agenda at least fortyeight hours in advance of meetings of the board and of committees
of which they are members, including all documentary materials they
need to consider matters proposed by management for approval at
the meeting; and
ii. Whether the board or any committee took action on any matters
during the previous fiscal year without benefit of such advance information and, if the matters involved material transactions, what the
transactions were and what actions the board took.
c. A brief description of the procedures and objective criteria, if any,
used by the board to monitor or evaluate the performance of management during the previous fiscal year.
d. A description of any staff assistance furnished to the directors.

4.

Information About Resignation of Directors
a. A list of all directors who have resigned since the last annual meeting
or are not standing for reelection, and a brief statement of the reason
why each resigned or is not standing for reelection. The statement either
should describe any factors in the operations of the corporation or the
organization or activities of its board of directors that bore a significant
relationship to the director's decision to resign or not stand for reelection,
or should note that there were no such factors.
b. A statement that each retiring director has reviewed and approved as
accurate the statement described above, or a description of such factors
prepared by each retiring director (which management, in its discretion,
may limit to 300 words).
C.

Explanation of Proposed Requirements

1. Information About Nominees
Directors are elected as individuals, not as a group." 2 Information about
112.

In the 1976 proxy statement of Mobil Oil Corp. stockholders were furnished an oppor-
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individual nominees may be relevant to shareholders' decisions to vote for or
against them. It can also contribute significantly to shareholders' and investors' understanding of the role the board and each of its committees plays
within a corporation.
Registrants now are required to furnish certain basic data about nominees
and directors under item 6 of schedule 14A, and many registrants supplement the required disclosures with various additional information such as a
list of additional directorships. Our reasons for adding to these requirements
are as follows.
a.

Affiliations

Probably the most important information about each nominee and director concerns his relationship with the management of the corporation. Such
information is widely regarded as highly relevant to assessing the probable
independence of individual directors from management, and thus of the
13
board as a whole and of each committee of the board.'
Many believe that directors who are officers or employees of a corporation
cannot be expected to monitor management,' 14 though some would argue
that this is not always the case.' 5 In any event it seems sensible to identify
clearly directors who are a part of management and what portion of the
board they constitute. We would classify as management directors all directors
tunity to indicate from which candidates, if any, stockholders wanted to withhold proxies. The
fact that directors are individually elected is at the heart of the suggestion that stockholders have
the opportunity to include their nominees in the corporation's proxy statement. See Note, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for Director in the Corporate Proxy Statement, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 1139 (1974).

113. The classification terms we suggest are drawn from the Corporate Directors Guidebook,
supra note 50, at 31. The Guidebook notes that "the terms 'affiliate' and 'affiliated directors' have
special meanings, not applicable here, for purposes of the federal securities laws." We attach the
same caveat to our use of those terms.
We envision a proxy statement in which the directors in each of the three categories are listed
under the appropriate heading, to present most clearly how the board is divided among those
groupings.
114. See Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 404-409; sources cited in note 96, supra. A professional
director has commented that "it's difficult to generate any wild enthusiasm among the inside
board members over challenging a proposal which has just been advanced by the man who pays
your salary." Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc., Changes in the Corporate Board
Room: What Should be Done? Who Should Do It? 35 (1974) [hereinafter cited as IRRC Report]
(quoting John A. Patton).
115. One argument sometimes advanced is that employee-directors can be very effective if
their principal economic stake in the company is as shareholders, rather than as employees. Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc., Corporations and the Political Process: Ashland Oil
Co., Analysis No. 1, Supp. No. 5, at 1-68 (1975) (quoting Orin E. Atkins, CEO of Ashland Oil

Co.).
On the other hand, some of the arguments for electing insiders to the board partake of a
certain Alice-in-Wonderland character. For example, Bacon and Brown cite one CEO who argued that a chief executive's tendency to misrepresent the company's performance, though not
inhibited by one insider on the board, would be inhibited by two. J. BACON & J. BROWN, Supra
note 96, at 64-65.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 41 : No. 3

whose current principal employment is as officers or employees of the corporation, one of its subsidiaries, or any corporation controlled by it or under
common control; and all directors who have retired within the past ten years
from full-time employment with the reporting corporation, one of its sub11 6
sidiaries, or any corporation controlled by it or under common control.
Opinion is divided about whether nonemployees who have professional,
business, or familial relationships with the management of a corporation
-such as outside counsel, investment bankers, commercial bankers, or officers of major suppliers or customers-can be counted on to use their position
on a board primarily to promote the interests of shareholders. The leading
commentators argue that a relationship of this kind may cause a director to
defer to management or to use his position on the board to promote his
personal interests even when they conflict with the interests of the corporation.1 17 Another view, advanced most often by persons who are associated
with the management of corporations they serve as directors, is that persons
with business or professional relationships with a corporation are particularly
knowledgable about the affairs of the corporation, and the board should not
be denied the benefits of their expertise. 1 8
The Fifty-Second American Assembly recently recommended that at least
a majority of a board of directors be outside directors, and stated that "family
ties, business or other professional arrangements may not disqualify one from
serving as a director, but such an individual cannot be held out as an 'outside
director' and the appropriate public documents should so indicate."'1 9 We
agree. Requiring the identification of such persons as affiliated directors and
identifying their exact affiliation will not remove them from the boards of
corporations, though it may create a pressure on boards to reduce their
number.1 2 0
116. Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 50, at 31. This definition would include within
the category of management director, retired operating executives who now devote substantial
amounts of time to their responsibilities as directors. Among major corporations, Texas Instruments, Inc., Connecticut General Insurance Corp., and Westinghouse Electric Co. have such directors on their boards. See J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 96, at 36-39; Board Power, 118
FORBES 47 (July 1, 1976).
117. See Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 405-406; Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1830-31;
M. MACE, supra note 96, at 199-203.

118.

See IRRC Report, supra note 114, at 52-54; J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 96, at

45-47; Guidebook Report, supra note 52, at 1850.

119. The Ethics of Corporate Conduct, Report of the Fifty-Second American Assembly, Harriman, N.Y., 5 (April 14-17, 1977). The New York Stock Exchange, by way of comparison, abandoned its effort to identify which directors are outside directors for purposes of its requirement
that all listed companies have audit committees made up of nonmanagement directors. It left to
companies' boards the decision as to which directors are "independent of management and free
from any relationship that .. .would interefere with the exercise of independent judgment as a
committee member," while providing them with some nonbinding guidance concerning factors to
be considered in making that determination. New York Stock Exchange, Audit Committee Policy
(Jan. 6, 1977).
120. It is difficult to determine, from available data, what proportion of the persons now
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As to what constitutes a significant relationship for this purpose, we recommend that a director be classed as affiliated if (a) he has during the last
fiscal year of the corporation engaged in, or proposes in the future to engage
in, transactions with the corporation that are material to the corporation, to
him, or to a corporation with which he is associated; (b) he has close familial
ties to an officer of the corporation; or (c) a director of a corporation of
which he is an officer or employee is an officer or employee of the corporation on whose board he serves. An appropriate guide for determining the
existence of a material business relationship would be the tests in schedule
14A of the proxy rules for required disclosure in a proxy statement of direct
or indirect material interest in transactions with the corporation. 121 Close
familial ties should include those who are first cousins or closer and the
spouses of all such persons.
To classify the directors chosen by a reciprocal arrangement as affiliated is
an expansion of the relationships usually mentioned as likely to influence a
director's judgment, but we believe disclosure of this relationship to be pertinent. We are not aware of any survey data on how common such relationships are, but we believe that a substantial portion of all outside directors are
involved in reciprocal relationships. How these relationships arise, and how
they are apt to warp a director's judgment, have been succinctly described by
Marvin Chandler, former CEO of the Northern Illinois Gas Company: 2 2
When A serves on B's board, A gets to know B and views him as a fine
executive, a compatible person, and an ideal director for A's company....
It is asking too much of A to pull no punches in his director's role at B's
company, when he knows that B in turn is appraising his [A's] performance.
It becomes almost like, 'You set my salary this week and I'll set your salary
next week.'
b.

Compensation

The amount of compensation paid to directors, and the basis on which it
is paid, may be significant indicators of the seriousness with which management views the board of directors and the seriousness with which the directors take their responsibilities. As Roderick M. Hills, then chairman of the
SEC, remarked, "Compensation for directors of too many large corporations

serving as nonmanagement directors of corporations would be classified as affiliated. Korn/Ferry
International found that in 1976, companies had "one or more of the following individuals" (who
might be classified as affiliated directors) on their boards:
Senior Executive (other companies)
85.5%
Commercial Banker
48.6%
Attorney (provides legal services to the company)
33.3%
Investment Bankers
30.9%
Korn/Ferry International, Board of Directors: Fourth Annual Study 8-9 (Feb. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as Korn/Ferry Survey].
121. Item 7, Schedule 14A.
122. Chandler, It's Time to Clean Up the Boardroom, 53 HARv. Bus. Rfv., Sept.-Oct. 1975, at 73.
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is set at a figure which makes it apparent that no real work is expected. 1 23
Similarly, Ralph M. Lewis, editor of the Harvard Business Review, has noted
that "if a high level of activity is expected of an outside director, he should be
well paid .... [O]utside directors are human, and they tend to view as important those activities for which they are well paid, even if the actual money is
1
inconsequential to them.

24

While the disclosure that directors are paid a pittance may indicate they
are not expected to do much, it does not necessarily follow that directors who
are well paid can be assumed to be playing an active and effective role. But
substantial fees are one indication that a corporation takes its directors
seriously.

c.

125

Attendance

It seems self-evident that whether a director regularly attends board and
committee meetings is relevant to an evaluation of his performance. 26 Indeed, the companies that responded to a recent survey of boards of directors
ranked attendance at board meetings as the second most important factor in
evaluating directors' performance, with seventy-seven per cent of the respondents listing it as significant.1 2 Thus a strong case exists that such informa128
tion should be disclosed to the public.
Data on the frequency and duration of board and committee meetings will
be valuable in permitting comparison among different corporations. 129 In ad123.

Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 301 (statement of Roderick M. Hills).

124. Lewis, Choosing and Using Outside Directors, 52 HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1974, at 70, 72.
See also HARVARD SyMPOsiuM, supra note 106, at 7.

Recent surveys indicate corporate directors are paid fees within a wide range, and on the basis
of several different compensation arrangements. See Korn/Ferry Survey, supra note 120, at 11-16;
Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., supra note 44; J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: COMPENSATION (1975).
125. Texas Instruments pays fees to its outside directors based in part on the amount of time
they devote to company business, and one commentator has suggested that corporations should
generally adopt this practice. Mace, Designing a Plan for the Ideal Board, 54 HARV. Bus. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 20, 36. [hereinafter cited as Mace, Ideal Board].
General Motors Corp., in the proxy statement for its 1977 annual meeting, described in some
detail itscompensation plan for directors. General Motors Corp. proxy statement dated May 20,
1977. However, it only published the exact amounts paid to the two outside directors who received more than $40,000 in 1976-the threshhold above which compensation must be reported.
See Item 7 of regulation 14A.
126. "[I]t is expected that a non-management director will devote substantial time to the affairs of the corporation ..

" CorporateDirector's Guidebook, supra note 50, at 33.

127. Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., supra note 44, at 12.
128. In the Stirling Homex release, supra note 63, the Commission noted somewhat disparagingly that the board had met only seven times in two years.
129. For example, one author describes a board with fifteen members, "some of whom spend
relatively little time on company problems," and an executive committee made up of the CEO
and four outside directors which plays quite an active role in overseeing the affairs of the company and meets much more frequently than does the full board. See Lewis, supra note 124, at 77;
Korn/Ferry, supra note 120, at 19. The proposed disclosure requirement would provide shareholders with significant indications that a board was so organized.
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dition, it will provide stockholders with an opportunity to determine whether
committees have devoted adequate time to their responsibilities. It also will
restrain exaggerations about the responsibility that a company may claim the
board has exercised.130 For example, there is evidence that in the last few
years many audit committees substantially increased the time they devoted to
reviewing companies' internal controls and financial reports.' 3' Shareholders
and investors should be provided with a sound basis for determining whether
this trend has occurred at a corporation, or whether the audit committee is
merely "spending two to four hours a year in cut-and-dried sessions with a
perfunctory look at the figures and the situations raised by the independent
auditor's management letter," a level of performance that one professional
director has stated "is not my idea of ... the proper discharge of the respon32
sibilities associated with service on an audit committee.'
d.

Other Directorships

To do a conscientious job a director must be able to devote a substantial
amount of time to the affairs of a corporation. Information about other directorships, particularly when combined with information about a director's
principal occupation and his attendance at board meetings, should provide
33
shareholders with an indication of whether the director is overextended.
2.

Information A bout Nominating Procedures

There is a clear nexus between the process by which directors are selected
and the likelihood that directors will serve as independent monitors of
management's performance. Similarly, the process of selection may have a
large bearing on the diversity of a board. The selection process is likely to
influence both the kinds of people chosen as directors and the manner in
which these people, once chosen, will serve on the board. The salient point to
Korn/Ferry found directors spent an average of 102.5 hours in 1976 on board business, including board and committee meetings and "expected homework."
130. Since the minutes of board and committee meetings usually state the time meetings
began and ended and the times directors present for less than the full meeting arrived or left,
compiling this data would not be very burdensome. Moreover, the existence of the minutes would
serve as a safeguard against puffing of a director's attendance figures.
131. See Mace, From the Boardroom, 53 HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1975, at 18, 170-171.
132. Barr, The Role of the Professional Director, 54 HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1976, at 18, 24.

On the relationship between time commitments and the effectiveness of the audit committee, see
generally Lovdal, Making the Audit Committee Work, 55 HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 108.
133. The SEC has proposed amending schedule 14A to require a listing of all other directorships. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5758, 10 SEC DOCKET No. 17, at 834 (Nov. 2, 1976). Some
argue, though, that requiring disclosure of other directorships would not serve this purpose. The
chairman of a large insurance company stated that he and most other outside directors are already seriously overcommitted. Consequently, he said, reducing the number of boards on which
he serves would not really allow him to devote much more time to those on which he continued
to serve. IRRC Report, supra note 114, at 39-40.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 41: No. 3

remember is that nomination as a management candidate is tantamount to
election.
In most publicly held corporations, the CEO selects the nonmanagement
candidates for election to the board. A recent survey of directorship practices
found that the "initial decisionmaker in approving board prospects" was the
chief executive officer in 46.5 per cent of the corporations responding, the
board as a whole in 24.9 per cent of the companies, the board's executive
committee in 15.5 per cent, a board nominating committee in 8.2 per cent,
134
the inside directors in 2.9 per cent, and others in 2.0 per cent.
In selecting outside directors, the CEO faces a conflict of interest. He has
a personal interest in avoiding candidates with the characteristics that make
135
effective, independent members of the board. According to one authority:
The typical CEO picks his outside directors with two things in mind:
1. He wants someone with whom he can feel comfortable. He needs no surprises. He feels he has enough problems running his business. The old
friend, whose reactions he knows well, with whom he can discuss confidential
issues, is a prime candidate. If the CEO moves outside the group he knows
personally, the candidate is rigorously investigated, the major questions being
'Is he solid?' and 'Is he sympathetic?'
2. At the same time, the CEO wants someone who will lend prestige to his
board.

Similarly a professional director found that in the replies of 160 CEO's to
a poll that he conducts about professional directors "there was an undercurrent . . .that could be paraphrased, 'We wish to God that we did not have any

outside directors, but especially no professional directors.' 136 The author
commented that this view appeared to reflect the desire of the managements
of many large corporations to reinstate the autocratic management styles used

134. Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., supra note 44, at 8. See also J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note
96, at 28 (similar conclusions from discussions with CEO's and directors).
135. Lewis, supra note 124, at 71. See also Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1826; Cole,
New Attention on the Corporate Director, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1977, § D, at 1.
One authority on boards suggest the following as typical of the way one CEO would invite
another to join his board:
George, we have a vacancy on our board, and I would be pleased if you would agree to
join us. You know most of our current board members. You are as busy as everyone
else but we meet only once a quarter at lunch, and meetings rarely take more than two
hours. You have to eat somewhere and we hope you will accept. I won't burden you
with a lot of homework. In fact we don't send out any material prior to meetings. Your
point of view as a corporate CEO, a proven generalist, would be most helpful to me.
Mace, Attracting New Directors, 54 HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 46, 48.
It is interesting to note that Heidrick and Struggles found 44.5 per cent of the chairmen
surveyed listed the reputation of their company as the most persuasive appeal for attracting
directors and 38.4 per cent listed the opportunity to contribute. "In contrast two-thirds of recently elected outside directors surveyed by Heidrick and Struggles in another study report that
the opportunity to contribute was the reason they joined boards. Only one fourth were motivated
primarily by company reputation." Heidrick & Struggles, supra note 44, at 8.
136. Barr, supra note 132, at 19.
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by those companies' founders. "[I]t is only natural," he said, "that many managements today must look back with a certain nostalgia to the days of the
1
founder and the inside board."'

37

The directors selected by a CEO are not likely to bite the hand that picked
them. Most of these directors will be chief or senior executives of other business corporations, members of the peer group of the CEO. They usually are
busy people, they sense that the CEO is not interested in having an active
board, and they behave passively.1 38 Robert M. Estes, former general counsel
of General Electric Company, has perceptively noted that the reason "why it's
so difficult to arouse outside directors as a class" is that most outside directors
are executives of other corporations. The "primary reactions" of such an executive to suggestions that boards be more active, Mr. Estes stated, "will tend
to be controlled by his primary role. In terms of the theory and practice of
corporate boards, his instinctive concern is the board where he carries the
ultimate personal responsibility for the success of the enterprise," not the
39
boards on which he sits as a nonmanagement director.
The disinclination of outside directors selected by the CEO to be assertive
is reinforced by the social ethic which dominates most boards' operations. A
nonmanagement director of several corporations remarked to one of the
authors :140
Being invited to sit on a board is just like being invited to join an exclusive
private club. In that atmosphere, I wouldn't think of asking the man in
charge of [a] division of [the] corporation why his rate of return is half that of
the industry average. It just isn't done.
Moreover, the pressures that constrain directors from asking penetrating
questions about the performance of division managers operate even more
forcefully when it is the chief executive's performance that a board is evaluating. Indeed, as Professor Mace has described, a board made up of directors
selected by the CEO is likely to remove him from office only when his "performance becomes so bad that even his mother thinks he has to leave .... ,,141
Finally, a nonmanagement director who is inclined to assert himself may
hesitate if the chief executive officer retains effective control over the nomina137.

Id. at 20. See also Groobey, Making the Board of Directors More Effective, 16 CAL. MANSpring 1974, at 25, 27.
138. IRRC Transcript, supra note 101, at 12-14 (remarks of Myles L. Mace).
139. Estes, supra note 106, at 127.
140. Clarence Randall, former chairman of Inland Steel, similarly acknowledged businessmen's belief "that criticism from outside is to be expected, but that it should never come from wvithin
the lodge itself" (Emphasis added.) C. RANDALL, THE FOLKLORE OF MANAGEMENT (1959) quoted in C.
BROWN, supra note 44, at xxvi. See also Groobey, supra note 137, at 28-29; Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d
1208, 1212 (1978) ("It is asking too much of human nature to expect that the disinterested director
will view with necessary objectivity the actions of colleagues in a situation where an adverse decision would be likely to result in considerable expense and liability for the individuals concerned.")
141. IRRC Transcript, supra note 101, at 9 (remarks of Myles L. Mace). See also McColough,
The Corporation and its Obligations, 53 HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1975, at 127, 131-132.
AGEMENT REV.,
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tion of directors for reelection. A director's "independence may be jeopardized if the board member's compensation is materially important to him and
if the management or chief executive officer has (or appears to have) the
dominant voice in the renomination of incumbent members."'1 42 This problem
may be even more acute for the director who depends on management for
the maintenance of a material professional or business relationship which
might be terminated, together with the director's membership on the board,
if the director behaves in a fashion that management decides is too independent. 143 In sum, if the CEO controls the proxy process, that control will
tend to reinforce "his economic and psychological dominance" of board
members whom he has selected personally. 144 It aggravates the situation that
outside directors often are chosen exclusively from the business community,
145
which furnishes too narrow a base from which to choose the entire board.
Short of making revolutionary changes in the corporate governance
system,' 146 the best alternative to having directors selected by the CEO is to
assign the task of selecting and renominating directors to a nominating committee made up of unaffiliated nonmanagement directors. 47 The Corporate
Director's Guidebook states that a nominating committee so constituted "is potentially the most significant channel for improved corporate governance,
since over a period of time it can have a marked impact on the composition
of the board of directors and the manner in which management succession is
effected.1"148
Professors Leech and Mundheim also assign a crucial role to the nominat149
ing committee. They state:
An important step in creating an environment conducive to an independent
attitude on the part of outside directors is selection of outside directors by a
142. Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1830.
143. Id.
144. Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 408.
145. See note 153 infra.
146. Such as having stockholders use the proxy materials to solicit support for their nominees.
We do not rule out the wisdom of such changes; we simply do not deal with them in this article.
147. General Motors Corp., among others, has such a nominating committee. See Leech &
Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1807.
148. CorporateDirector's Guidebook, suqpra note 50, at 35.
149. Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1830. See also C. BROWN, supra note 44, at 48-49;
Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 407-408; Transcript, Conference on Federal Chartering of Corporations, American Enterprise Institute, Wash., D.C., 128-29 (June 21, 1976) (remarks of Roderick
M. Hills, then Chairman of the SEC); Cf. Mace,JohnJ. McCloy on Corporate Payoffs, 54 HARV. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1976, at 14, 159 quoting McCloy:
Professional managers have had too much authority in selecting directors and in determining what their functions are. The selection of new members of the board should
not be the prerogative solely of the management. The outside board members already
in place should more actively participate in the selection....
The American Assembly recommended establishment of nominating committees with a majority of outside directors "to search for qualified candidates of diverse background for submission
to the full board as possible nominees to the board." The Ethics of Corporate Conduct, supra
note 119, at 5.
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nominating committee composed wholly of outside directors. Although the
nominating committee should consult with the chief executive officer about
possible board candidates, the committee should not feel bound to adopt
management's slate of candidates.
The existence of a nominating committee made up of outside directors is
not apt to result in dramatic changes in the membership of a board, but it is
likely to increase the director's feeling of loyalty to the board rather than to
the CEO. Over time both the new selection process and the resultant feelings
of independence are likely to become institutionalized.1 50
The requirements we propose for disclosure about the nominating process
aim not only to inform shareholders but to influence the electoral process as
well. The latter objective is justified by the SEC's interest in enhancing board
Disclosure is
independence, which depends upon the selection process.'
especially well suited to effect change in this area. Many chief executives are
notorious for their consistent claims of obeisance to the interests of their
stockholders and the dictates of their boards. Rather than admit publicly that
they monitor their own monitors, they are likely to surrender some of their
control over nominations. 152 Disclosure should also affect shareholder participation. With information about nominating procedures and criteria, shareholders will be better equipped to discuss prospective candidates with manage153
ment or the board.
a.

Procedures

The disclosure of procedures used to select nominees would include a description of who-the CEO, a nominating committee, the full board, or
others-is responsible for recommending board prospects; what processes are
used to identify and screen prospects; whether the CEO has a right to veto
new candidates or nominees for reelection; and whether the board, or any
committee of the board, regularly solicits or reviews shareholders' recommendations on changes in board membership.' 54 A corporation should also be re-

150.

IRRC Report, supra note 114, at 22.

151. This point has been made by Professor Alfred Conard, who has argued that directors'
liability should be premised principally on their failure "to remove incompetent directors, or ...
to call for investigation of symptoms of malfunction." See Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors'
Liabilityfor Negligence, 1972 DUKE L.J. 893, 917.
152. See HARVARD SYMPOsIUM, supra note 106, at 14.
153. For example, when a shareholder group tried to question the chairman of General
Motors Corp. about the reasons why two new directors had been added to GM's board, it received responses that added little to its understanding of why those persons had been chosen. See
Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419,
477-78 (1971).
154. The Corporate Director's Guidebook says that a procedure allowing shareholder to make

suggestions to a nominating committee will be "a more effective and workable method of affording access to the nominating process to individual shareholders than a direct 'right' of nomination
in the corporation's proxy materials." Corporate Director'sGuidebook, supra note 50, at 35.
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quired to notify shareholders if these procedures have not been followed with
respect to any nominee. t55
b.

Criteria

The disclosure of criteria for selection of nominees should identify the
traits that the person or persons responsible for nominations look for in all
candidates and formulae that may be used in order to obtain a desired balance on the board.15 6 For example, a recent survey found seven considerations were listed by at least ten per cent of the respondent companies as relevant to their selection of new directors. 157 Some corporations clearly prefer a
board made up primarily of CEO's of other companies; 158 in those cases that
criterion would be mentioned. Similarly, if a corporation had a policy limiting
the number of CEO's on its board, a policy barring all affiliated persons from
being directors, a policy limiting the number of management directors, or a
policy requiring that a certain proportion of the board be made up of unaffiliated nonmanagement directors, these policies would be disclosed. Armed
with this information, shareholders would be in a much better position to suggest nominees to management and to evaluate whether new nominees were
qualified in terms of the announced criteria. 15 9 If they disagreed with the cor-

155. The notification requirement should promote independence among the directors by
making arbitrary action against them more difficult to pursue. See C. BROWN, supra note 44, at
84; Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1831.
156. See Heller, The Board of Directors: Legalistic Anachronism or Vital Force, 14 CAL. MANAGEMENT REV., Spring 1972, at 24, 28:
What steps should a company take to make sure that the proper people are serving on
its board of directors? Specific criteria should be developed and tailored to the needs of
the individual company ...
Once the specific criteria for a company's board members have been developed and
agreed upon, the present composition of the board should be analyzed and evaluated.
A program must then be developed to recruit to fill identified needs and to develop a
strategy for retiring board members whose future contributions are likely to be limited.
157. The factors and the precentages of companies that considered them in selecting directors
were:
Probable ability to contribute
98.6%
Stature
52.6%
Functional area represented
45.5%
Experience as directors
35.4%
Time availability
26.9%
Stock ownership
12.3%
Geographic area represented
10.0%
Heidrick & Struggles, supra note 44, at 9. See also J. BACON, supra note 44, at 40-47.
158. See Barr, supra note 132, at 19, commenting on this phenomenon. Another atypical director of several major corporations notes that "an individual who spends his or her life solely in
the pursuit of greater corporate efficiency and maximizing the profits of the stockholder is
somewhat removed from the day-to-day ferment of political life." Harris, New Constitutenciesfor
the Board in CONFERENCE BOARD 1972 REPORT, supra note 42. See also HARVARD SYMPOSIUM, Supra
note 106, at 8; Mace, Ideal Board, supra note 125, at 30.
159. A few companies have volunteered information about how they select directors. By examining that information, we can gain some insight into what information registrants might make
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poration's criteria, they would also be in a position to make more informed
and sophisticated suggestions for altering them.
Requiring disclosure of the criteria for renomination of directors would let
stockholders know if a board had some standards or process for evaluating
directors' performance. While some of the criteria disclosed, such as the quality of a director's suggestions, might be relatively meaningless, others-such as
attendance at board and committee meetings, time devoted to reviewing the
company's operations, or specified ages or circumstances for retirementwould be moderately significant to an evaluation of the board's operations
and the manner in which it actually applied these criteria to nomination for
reelection. The publication of such criteria might also make it easier for the
board to rid itself of dead wood without undue embarrassment.
c.

Proxy Review

There is no specific legal requirement that the board of directors review a
corporation's proxy materials, and we are not suggesting that the SEC impose
such a requirement. However if our other recommendations are adopted,
much of a registrant's proxy statements will be devoted to the selection of directors and the organization and operations of the board. It would then be desirable for the SEC to require that shareholders at least be informed whether
the board itself had reviewed the proxy materials before they were published.
Finally, requiring disclosure of the manner in which the board exercises
control over proxy solicitation expenses will complete the picture of who controls the corporation's participation in the election process. Control of the
purse strings is an important part of that process, and information should be

available pursuant to the proposed disclosure requirement and how that information might be
used by investors.
The criteria used by Northern Illinois Gas Co. for evaluating a potential nonmanagement director appear in Chandler, supra note 122, at 76. A description of the criteria and process used to
select nonemployee directors of Exxon Corp. and how they performed in one instance appears in
2 IRRC News for Investors 100-01 (May 1975). General Motors, in its proxy statement for its
1975 annual meeting, included a discussion of the basis on which it selected directors. As a part
of its director selection process, Pullman, Inc., reportedly uses a matrix to analyze the skills
needed to perform directorship duties and the skills possessed by its current directors. See Mace,
supra note 135, at 54.
While a corporation probably would use the same language from year to year to describe its
criteria-unless those criteria change-these statements would not be meaningless formulae.
Rather they would provide a basis for shareholders to use voice to bring about changes in the
criteria. See notes 80 to 85 supra and related text.
By publishing the criteria used to select directors, a corporation also would better inform
shareholders when it was undertaking major shifts in the makeup of its board. That rarely is
done now. For an example, in the early 1970's Xerox Corp. shifted from a board made up
largely of Rochester, N.Y.-based businessmen to one made up of prominent academics and
international businessmen, but did not provide shareholders with an explicit statement that it was
making such a shift or an explanation as to why it was being made. See Investor Responsibility
Research Center, Inc., Shareholder Nomination of Candidates for Director: Xerox Corp.,
Analysis No. 7, Supp. No. 2 (April 30, 1973).
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made available about how closely the board or any of its committees supervise
expenditures for proxy solicitations.
3.

Information About Board Organizationand Activities

Requiring disclosure of how a board is organized and how it has functioned can both influence the board's performance and generate information
of considerable importance to shareholders. Information about the organization and activities of directors is highly relevant to board elections, since the
vast majority of candidates for election as directors are standing for reelection. Data about the performance of those candidates and the boards on
which they have served are likely to be highly relevant to shareholders' voting
decisions in cases where there is any choice, as well as relevant to nominations.
It is in the area of board activities, however, that the constraints of confidentiality, of limiting disclosure requirements to matters of legitimate interest
to shareholders, and of keeping disclosure within manageable limits all are
likely to be most vexing.
In our view, the best approach to balancing these conflicting interests is to
be selective in developing disclosure requirements relating to the activities of a
board, and to focus those requirements on the processes through which the
board operates rather than on the substance of the board's deliberations or
decisions. Specifically, the disclosure requirements should focus on the board's
committee system, on the flow of information to the board, and on the process by which the board monitors management's performance. Related to
these matters is the amount of staff assistance furnished to the board.
a.

Committees

Boards are coming to rely more heavily on committees as a means of carrying out their responsibilities, 16' and that trend is likely to accelerate if a
recent amendment to the American Bar Association's Model Business Corporation Act is adopted widely as part of state corporation laws. The amendment
allows a director to rely on information and reports presented by a board
committee on which he does not serve if he reasonably believes that the com"
mittee deserves his confidence. 16
'
160.

See IRRC Report, supra note 114, at 15-16 for a description of the committee system

developed by the board of General Electric Co.; and id. at 42-44 for a discussion of the pros and
cons of increasing use of committees. See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1807-09 for a
description of the committee system developed by the board of General Motors Corp. See also
HARVARD SYMPOSIUM, supra note 106, at 10; under a recently adopted New York Stock Exchange
Rule, by June 30, 1978, all listed companies must have audit committees comprised solely of independent, nonmanagement directors. New York Stock Exchange, supra note 119.
161. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (Supp. 1977). See also the comment of the ABA
Committee on Corporate Laws on this portion of its amendment to the Act in ABA Comm. on
Corporate Laws, supra note 49.
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Information about what committees a board has, what their authority and
responsibilities are, how they report to the full board, and how committee
members are selected can be vital to any appraisal of the role that board
plays.162 For example, some boards have executive committees that meet
much more frequently than the full board, that are authorized to exercise all
of the powers of the full board except those reserved to the board by statute,
that do not report regularly or in any detail to the full board, and that are
made up wholly or primarily of management directors selected by the CEO.
Other corporations have executive committees that meet infrequently, that
limit themselves to matters of relatively minor importance, that require formal
board approval, that report all their actions to the full board, and that are
made up mostly of nonmanagement directors who are selected by the board
as a whole. 1 63 In appraising a board of directors' role, it would be critically
important to know whether the board has an executive committee, and if so,
which of these two models it most resembles.
The same can be said of other committees, such as compensation, audit,
finance, nominating, and public policy committees, though the considerations
of greatest importance with regard to any one committee may depend on the
committee and the makeup of the board as a whole.16 4 For example, it is
important to know whether the members of an audit committee are selected
by the board as a whole where management directors make up a majority of
the board, or whether a nominating committee made up completely of unaffiliated nonmanagement directors has been delegated full authority to select
new nominees to the board, or whether a compensation committee of nonmanagement directors has been authorized to retain its own legal counsel to
review proposed management compensation plans.
Moreover, the information about a board's committee system will be complemented by the proposed disclosures about directors' affiliations with management and the frequency and length of committee meetings. Viewed together, this information should help shareholders and other interested
persons to understand the contribution of each committee and its members to
the activities of the board.
162. Few data are available about these aspects of board practice. It is interesting to note,
though, that the Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 50, at 27, says a "director is entitled to
receive a copy of minutes of all meetings of the full board and each board committee (whether or
not he is a member)." Yet only 35.6 per cent of the companies responding to recent survey said
they provided directors, prior to board meetings, with summaries of action taken by board committees subsequent to the last board meeting. Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., supra note 44, at 10.
163. The range of practices corporations follow with respect to the organization, authority,
and membership of their executive committees is outlined in J. BACON, supra note 44, at 64-68,
and J. BACON & J. BRowN, supra note 96, at 105-117.

164. See id. at 117-140 for a discussion of the different roles played in different corporations
by audit, compensation, finance, nominating, social responsibility, contributions, and other board
committees. For a useful illustration of a framework within which a "well-functioning compensation committee might perform," see Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1823-24.
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Information Systems

Information is the lifeblood of a board's activities. Without an adequate
flow of accurate information, it is close to impossible for a board to play any
meaningful role within a corporation. 165 A board needs information for two
purposes. One is monitoring management's performance, and the other is
passing on specific transactions or policy recommendations.
The SEC has an interest in assuring that registrants' boards receive the
information they need to meet their obligations under the securities laws, and
investors have an interest in knowing whether the board had access to all
information it felt it needed. 166 However, defining thorough standards of
general application for what is an adequate flow of information is not feasible,
and requiring disclosure of all information that is transmitted to a board is
probably neither practicable nor desirable. 167 Thus, fashioning a disclosure requirement relating to the flow of information to the board presents a formidable problem.
Our recommendation concerning information flows recognizes these problems, and is intended to achieve only a limited objective: to deter the board
from serving as a rubber stamp for management's recommendations, and
to assist shareholders in determining whether the board is acting in that
fashion.' 68 If, for example, a board regularly approves the consummation of
major transactions on the basis of information first presented to it at board
meetings, we believe the inference can fairly be drawn that the board exercises very little independent judgment in reviewing management's recommendations.

16 9

165. See Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 50, at 16. See also Heller, supra note 156, at
26: "To make board meetings as effective as possible, each board member should receive an
advance information package and should have at least three or four days to study this material
before he is asked to act on it at the meeting."
166. In its Report of Investigation Concerning Stirling Homex Corp., the Commission placed
great stress on the fact that "There existed no internal system by which they [the outside
directors] were regularly provided with significant information concerning corporate affairs.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11516, supra note 63, at 85,462.
167.

See Mace, Management Information Systems for Directors, 53 HARV. Bus. REV.,

Nov.-Dec.

1975, at 14, 17 (corporate practice in informing directors varies). For more specific information
on the variety of corporate practices in this area, see J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 96, at
89-98; Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., supra note 44, at 10.
168. Professor Mace reports:
I recently learned of companies which follow the practice of not mailing out anything
prior to meetings and requiring that any company information provided at the meeting
be turned in prior to leaving the boardroom. The explanation was that directors could
not be trusted to observe the confidentiality of sensitive inside information.
Mace, Ideal Board, supra note 125, at 198.
169. See The Board: It's Obsolete Unless Overhauled, Special Report, Bus. WEEK, May 22, 1971, at
50, 55 (Quoting Robert E. Brooker, chairman of the executive committee of Marcor, Inc.: "If
you're going to have an effective outside board, it must be briefed in advance. It's unfair to ask
directors to make decisions only from board discussions.")
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The basic disclosure called for is whether the board regularly receives at
least two days in advance of board and committee meetings what it considers
to be adequate information about matters management suggests it address at
those meetings. If the board regularly receives such information, it would be
able to note that fact. (Of course disclosure that the board received information
does not guarantee that it then made an independent judgment on the basis
of that information. But it at least increases the chance.) However, if there
were times when the board authorized or approved material transactions
without advance information, we believe shareholders should be informed of
those facts. Our guess is that in most such instances the board also would
choose to explain to shareholders why it believed taking such action without
advance information had been in the shareholder's best interest, even though
1 70
such explanations would not be required.
c.

Monitoring Systems

Given the importance of the board's monitoring role, it is essential that the
disclosure system both encourage boards to play such a role and provide
shareholders with the basis for understanding whether and how the board is
doing so."'

A requirement that registrants disclose the procedures and criteria used by
their boards of directors to monitor management's performance should go a
long way toward attaining this goal. First, to the extent that the disclosure
requirement causes a board to think through and articulate its monitoring
process, it will make a major contribution to the institutionalization of that
process within the corporation. More than two thirds of the corporations responding to one recent survey reported that they did not have a formal management audit procedure for directors to follow. 1 72 Yet as Professors Leech
1 73
and Mundheim point out:
It is not enough to encourage the chief executive to want to have a board
which does an effective monitoring job. The only effective instrument for
change is the institutionalization of processes that make it mandatory for the
chief executive to account to a strong board.
Once the principal components of the monitoring system have been published, a board would be under considerable pressure to use the system and
to explain its actions toward management in terms of the criteria it had announced. For example, if one element of a corporation's evaluation system
170. For example, a board might feel impelled to take a major action without advance information because the corporation faced an unexpected crisis, such as an unexpected tender offer to

which management wants to react very quickly. See Wall St. J., June 13, 1977, at 4, col. 1 (Avis
board decides not to accept competing tender offer for Avis stock).
171. Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 402-403.
172. Korn/Ferry Survey, supra note 120, at 18.
173. Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1827.
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was to "evaluate the performance of the CEO and division president's quarterly, based on comparisons with the performance of competitors, when appropriate competitive information is available,"' 14 the board would probably
feel compelled to question the performance of a lagging division, and either
to change the management of that division or to explain to shareholders why
the division was having problems and what the board or management intended to do about them.
Secondly, the description of the procedures used, when combined with
information about directors' affiliations and about time devoted to board activities, would provide investors with a good indication of the independence
of the monitors and of the amount of time they are devoting to this task. It
also would enable investors to know whether a board, or the responsible
committee of the board, regularly used the services of persons outside the
corporation's management-such as management consultants-to assist it in
developing a monitoring system or data to be used in evaluating management's
performance.
Finally, publication of the criteria used to evaluate management's performance should provide investors with valuable insights into the corporation's
future performance. It is well documented that corporate officials generally
are very responsive to the criteria used to rate their performance., 75 Thus,
investors would better understand and predict management's behavior if they
knew that a corporation's board evaluated management on any of the following criteria: quarterly, annual, or five-year goals; increases in sales, net income, or return on assets employed or shareholders' equity; development of
new products; diversification or consolidation; or responsiveness to social
pressures or government programs.1 76 Moreover, while corporations, corporate officials, or researchers have listed all of these criteria as components of
their evaluation systems, 1 77 several of them are inconsistent with others, and
174. This was one of the responsibilities of the board set out in a model charter for the board
of directors. Mace, Ideal Board, supra note 125, at 21.
175. See, e.g., R. ACKERMAN, supra note 31.
176. For a recent illustration of how management evaluation systems influence corporate performance, see Wall St. J., June 1, 1977, at 1, col. 6 (in many corporations evaluation systems
stressing return on investment have operated to deter needed investment in new capital equipment).
Information about a board's evaluation system also will aid interested parties in determining
whether the board sees its primary responsibility to be preventing financial disasters or driving
management to outperform its competitors. See Clendenin, Company Presidents Look at the Board of
Directors, 14 CAL. MANAGEMENT REV., Spring 1972, at 60.

177. See Mace, Ideal Board, supra note 125, at 21-22 (listing numerous factors to be used in
evaluating management); IRRC Transcript, supra note 101, at 55 (remarks of Louis V. Cabot,
describing evaluation of CEO against a set of 5-year goals); Bauer, Cauthorn & Warner, Auditing
the Management Process for Social Performance, Bus. & Soc'Y REV., Fall, 1975, at 39 (suggesting a

"process audit" of management responsiveness to social pressures); Berkshire Hathaway Corp.,
1976 Annual Report to the Stockholder (letter from chairman of the board Warren E. Buffet
stating that rate of return on shareholder's equity is "a much more significant yardstick of
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many of them could not sensibly be used together in the unique circumstances presented by individual companies. As a consequence, it seems unlikely that corporations would respond to this requirement with standardized
language ("boilerplate"), and to the extent that they do, shareholders and investment analysts are likely to subject their boards and managements to vigorous criticism for failing to develop a consistent set of goals in terms of
178
which the corporation's performance can be evaluated.
d.

Staff Assistance

The lack of institutionalized staff assistance caused Arthur J. Goldberg to
resign from the board of directors of TWA.1 79 Justice Goldberg advocated the
creation of a staff of professionals who would serve the outside directors of
the corporation, thereby enhancing their independence. There was much adverse comment on the proposal, 180 but most of the criticism was focused on
Goldberg's proposal that the staff be independent from the company.
The desirability of providing staff assistance has gained significant support. General Motors furnishes its board committees with considerable employee assistance, although no one is assigned to assist the board on a permanent basis. 8 When asked at an annual meeting what kind of staff assistance
GM's Public Policy Committee received, Chairman James Roche responded,
"They have access to all the staffs in General Motors for whatever purpose
they may require."' 8 2 Robert Estes, former general counsel of General Electric
Company, has urged the assignment of counsel to the outside directors, since
83
so much of what properly concerns them involves legal issues.'
It does seem clear that the judgments directors are required to make involve complex matters on a wide range of subjects. No busy director, not even
the most versatile, can give proper attention to all these matters without some
assistance. He can obtain it on his own, or he can follow the lead of other,
economic performance" than total operating earnings). Cf. RCA's New Vista: The Bottom Line, Bus.
WEEK July 4, 1977, at 38 (noting a shift in RCA Corp.'s strategy away from promoting technological innovation in favor of increasing short-term earnings, which RCA's annual report "subtly
underscores" by featuring a cover picture of a Hertz Corp. airport bus, rather than the traditional picture of some aspect of RCA Corp. technology).
178. If a board can demonstrate that it acts as an independent monitor of management's
performance, management, too, would benefit in that proof of board review would effectively
insulate management's decisions from judicial second-guessing, if those decisions are challenged

by shareholders. See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1805.
179. Goldberg, supra note 42.
180. See Blough, The Outside Director at Work on the Board, 28

RECORD OF

N.Y.C.B.A. 202

(1973); Smith, The Goldberg Dilemma: Directorships, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1973, at 14, col. 3; Eisen-

berg, supra note 46, at 390. But see Schwartz, A Plan to Save the Board, 28

RECORD OF

N.Y.C.B.A.

279 (1973).
181. Leech & Mundheim, supra note 53, at 1808.
182. Transcript of Annual Meeting of GM Stockholders, May 21, 1971, at 281 (on file with
the authors).
183. Estes, supra note 106. See also IRRC Report, supra note 114, at 42.
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more knowledgeable colleagues on the board, but both of these methods seem
chancy. Alternatively, the corporation can provide staff assistance. What is
done in this regard seems to us to bear on the professionalism and performance of the outside directors, the board, and the corporation.
4.

84

Information About Directors' Resignations1
a.

Explanation of the Proposal

Finally, we have proposed that the Commission impose on registrants new
disclosure requirements relating to directors' resignation and retirement.
Registrants would be required to list all directors who have left the board
since the last annual meeting or are not standing for reelection, and to state
the reasons why each of them has taken such action.
These disclosure requirements would differ from the others we have
proposed in that each of the other requirements was to some degree oriented
toward affecting a director's or a board's conduct in a particular way. Here
the purpose of our proposed requirement is not to encourage or discourage
directors to resign, and we do not believe there is any sound basis for predicting that it would have either of those effects.
Moreover, the other disclosure requirements we have proposed are designed to assist shareholders in understanding whether and how individual
directors and the board are meeting their legal responsibilities. No analogous
legal standard relevant to the proposed disclosure requirements governs resignations. Specifically, it is well established that directors are free to resign for
any reason they choose,1 85 so long as they do not resign to secure some private pecuniary gain 18 6 or as part of a plan to transfer control of the corporation to persons who they have reason to believe will manage the corporation
in a manner that is adverse to the interests of the shareholders.

87

However, although the proposed requirements do not aim to influence
directors' decisions to resign, we believe they would serve two important purposes. First, they would strengthen the independence of the board by
strengthening the position of directors within the corporation. Second, they

184. The proposed requirement would apply to resignations, retirements, situations where a
director chooses not to stand for reelection, and situations where the persons in control of the
registrant's proxy materials do not nominate a director for reelection. Registrants also should be
required to file the information required by this section in a Form 8-K since the information may
be material to ongoing investment decision-making. Cf. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 165
[1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,187 (Dec. 20, 1974), requiring increased disclosure in Form
8-K relating to registrants' changes of independent public accountants.
185. "A director or other officer of a corporation may resign at any time and thereby cease to
W. FLETCHER, 2 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 345
be an officer.
(1969).
186. Id. § 348; Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
187. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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would ensure that potentially significant information about a corporation or
its board is made available to investors.
The SEC has recognized for some years, in the case of registrants' independent public accountants, that required disclosure about the circumstances
under which a registrant has changed accountants can enhance the independence of accountants. In late 1971 the SEC instituted a requirement that
companies report a change in the auditors who certified their most recent financial statements.188 In late 1974 the Commission amended and strengthened that requirement. 1 9 After noting that "[o]ne of the underpinnings of
the Commission's administration of the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws is its reliance on the reports of independent public accountants on the financial statements of registrants," the Commission stated that
"to enhance the accountant's independence," registrants should be required
to report the resignation or dismissal of their principal accountants and
the details of any "significant disagreement" between registrants and their
accountants during the past two years.' 90 This requirement was intended to
deter registrants from dismissing their accountants because they did not like
the accountants' proposed treatment of some matter or the accountants' stated
intent to qualify their opinion. It also was intended to notify investors of the
existence of a dispute where it had led a registrant to change accountants. 9 '
A nonmanagement director of a corporation who attempts to exercise independent judgment is in a position similar to that of the independent public
accountant-that is, the director is weak because his activities primarily benefit
persons other than management (i.e., the shareholders) and because he must
obtain the support of a majority of the board.' 92 Management, which may
control the proxy process or command the loyalities of a majority of the
board, has little stake in allowing or encouraging the director to pursue activities that it views as prejudicial to its interests. One approach to strengthening the director's position is to provide him with a new base of power by
ensuring that his point of view will be provided to investors. A disclosure
requirement in this area should discourage a corporation's management from
denying directors' legitimate demands or from pressuring a director or the

188. Item 12, Form 8-K was adopted in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9344,
[1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,304 (Sept. 27, 1971) (now renumbered
as item 4).
189. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 165, [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,189 (Dec.

20, 1974).
190. Id.
191.

For a discussion of the requirement, see Hawes Stockholder Appointment of Independent Au-

ditors:' A Proposal, 74

COLUM.

L.

REV.

1 (1974); Hawes, Changing Auditors, 7

(1974).
192.

REV. SEC. REG.

935

For an enlightening analysis of the dynamics of the auditor-management relationship,
An Analysis Using Concepts of Exchange Theory, 51
ACCOUNTING REV. 375 (1976).

see Nichols & Price, The Auditor-Firm Conflict:
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board as a whole to behave in an inappropriate fashion.1" 3 It gives bite to a
director's conscience-driven threat to resign unless certain reforms are instituted or certain disclosures made.
The proposed disclosure requirement will also ensure that shareholders
are informed when one oi more of the persons they have elected as directors
are leaving a board because they have serious misgivings about the activities
or organization of the corporation or its board. The social ethic that now
discourages controversy even within the boardroom creates a barrier that, in
general, assures that all but the most independent directors will decline to
go public about the concerns that have caused them to leave a corporate
board.19 4 The director who is uncomfortable about his position is more likely
to resign quietly or to decline to stand for reelection. Yet it seems clear that
the concerns that lead a director to resign may be of considerable interest to
shareholders and to those considering purchasing the stock of the corporation.
The resignation of Robert Odell from the board of the Penn Central Company illustrates dramatically the problems our proposed requirement would
alleviate.1 9 5 Odell resigned in 1970 when his inquiry into Penn Central's involvement with Great Southwest Corporation was frustrated by both manage-

193. Nichols and Price state that one approach to increasing the power of the auditor is to
increase "the ability of a replaced auditor to cause sanctions to be imposed on the firm resulting
from unjustified replacement." Id. at 344. They cite the SEC rules governing replacement of
auditors as an example of this approach. They conclude, though, that these procedures will have
variable success. Id. at 345. Similarly, the existence of the proposed disclosure requirements will
not ensure that directors will assert their independence.
Nichols and Price suggest two other ways to influence the balance of power between auditors
and firms, both of which also are suggestive of steps that might be taken to strengthen the
position of directors. The first would be to increase the expected cost to the auditor of taking
inappropriate actions, for example by providing "greater specification of auditing and accounting
standards." Id. Similarly, directors' behavior might be influenced by making more clear the legal
responsibilities of directors. The second would be to change "the structure of the auditor-firm
contractual relationship" by shifting away from management the responsibility for selecting auditors. Id. As we discussed above, similar changes relating to the selection of directors appear
quite promising. See notes 148-50 supra, and accompanying text.
194. We can recall only two instances in which nonmanagement directors announced publicly
that they had resigned from a corporate board because of concern about corporate or board
activities. One was Arthur J. Goldberg's resignation from the board of TWA because he thought
outside directors should be provided with their own staffs and with better access to information
about major corporate decisions. Goldberg, supra note 42. The other involved Norton Simon's
decision to resign from the board of Burlington Northern. The company circulated to its
shareholders a statement written by Simon setting out his disagreements with the business
strategy Burlington Northern was pursuing. Burlington Northern, Inc., Report on Fourth Annual Meeting (held May 10, 1973). Apparently, Simon also brought his concerns about the accounting practices being used by Burlington Northern to the attention of the enforcement staff
of the SEC, which after investigation, brought an enforcement action against the company. See
also Burlington Northern Accepts SEC Order Involving Disclosure, Wall St. J., April 29, 1977, at 16,

col. 3.
195.

This incident is described in considerable detail in

STAFF OF THE

SEC, supra note 60.
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ment and fellow directors.1 96 Odell's inquiry would have uncovered Penn Central's massive real estate losses and its manipulation of Great Southwest to
conceal them,1 97 but his misgivings-though clearly expressed to management
and board-were not related to the shareholders until after Penn Central had
declared bankruptcy. Our proposed requirement would have discouraged the
management from bringing Odell to the point of resignation; or once he resigned, his reasons would have been explained publicly.1 95
b.

Framing the Requirement

A key issue in drafting the proposed disclosure requirement concerning
directors' resignations is that registrants should feel compelled to report the
factors affecting resignations of directors that are likely to be of legitimate
interest to shareholders. The SEC faced a similar issue when it drafted its
regulations about registrants' relationships with their auditors. In that case the
Commission decided not to require a registrant to disclose the reason for
every change of auditors, largely because many changes are made because of
disagreements about auditor's fees, and the Commission concluded registrants
should not be required to explain their decisions in those situations. 9 Eventually, the SEC decided to require detailed disclosure only if during the two
years prior to the change of accountants, there had been a disagreement between the registrant and its accountant about a matter which, had the disagreement not been resolved in favor of the accountant, would have resulted
in the accountant qualifying his opinion. 0 0
The standard adopted by the SEC to define when detailed disclosure is
required in the case of a change of accountants has given rise to a number of
interpretive problems, 20 yet it probably is more precise than any standard

196. "The other directors paid little attention to the whole matter, particularly because Odell
was 'solving' the problem for them by leaving." Id. at 170.
197. For details of Penn Central's involvement with Great Southwest Corp., see id. at 121-150.
198. We do not intend to suggest that any of these consequences would have prevented the
collapse of the Penn Central, but they might have helped to limit some of the damage done by
management's deception, including the almost disastrous impact on financial markets of the
company's seemingly sudden collapse. Id. at viii-x.
See also the letter of another director, Louis Cabot, to the chairman of Penn Central, id. at
164-65 (expresses concern about the relationship between Penn Central's management and
board).
199. See Bedingfield & Loeb, Auditor Changes-An Examination, 137 J. ACCOUNTANCY 66, 67-68
(1974).
200. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 165, [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,187 (Dec.
20, 1974). The Commission has apparently reconsidered that decision. It recently proposed to
amend its rules to require that the reason for an auditor's resignation be made public in all cases.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5868 [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,305 (Sept. 26, 1977).
201. These problems are discussed in Kay, Disagreements Under Accounting Series Release No.
165, 142 J. ACCOUNTANCY 75 (1976) and Weiss, Disclosure Surrounding a Change in Auditors: Accounting Series Release 165, 45 CPA J. 11 (1975).
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that might be developed to define which reasons for a director's decision to
leave a board are likely to be of interest to shareholders. Consequently, patterning the disclosure requirements here on the approach the SEC has followed with respect to changes of accountants does not appear to be an available course.
A better approach, we believe, would be to require a statement of the
reasons why each director has left the board and, if factors involving the operations of the corporation or the organization or activities of its board of
directors bore no significant relationship to the director's decision to leave, to
require an affirmative statement to that effect. Requiring an explanation of all
resignations should not cause any severe problems, as it is difficult to see how
anybody would be discomforted by a disclosure that a director resigned "for
personal reasons" or "due to the press of other commitments"-the factors
that probably motivate most resignations. 20 2 At the same time, requiring a
statement that no factors of a kind likely to be of interest to investors bore a
significant relationship to the director's decision should maximize the pressure
on registrants to disclose any such factors, since making a false or misleading
statement in this regard could give rise to liability under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
Thus, if a director resigns because of a dispute over corporate strategy,
because of concerns that the board is not receiving adequate information
about the corporation, because he disagrees with the system used by the
board to evaluate management's performance, because he feels the board tries
to involve itself too deeply in the details of managing the corporation's business, or for other comparable reasons, the registrant would include a statement to that effect in its proxy statement. Moreover, to further safeguard the
integrity of the process, registrants would be required to provide a director
who has left the board with a draft of the statement explaining his action,
and either to report that the director does not dispute the statement or to
circulate to shareholders a statement prepared by the director setting forth
his point of view.
c.

Potential Problems

There are three problems which, we believe, some might suggest will be
caused by requiring disclosure about directors' resignations. One is that cor202. These explanations probably could legitimately cover those situations where a director
has been fired because he has not made a sufficient contribution to the board. Heidrick and

Struggles asked the companies it surveyed if they had ever fired a director and received the
following responses:
None ever fired
63.6%
Resignation requested
Not renominated
Asked not to run again
Size of board reduced
Other
Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., supra note 44, at 12.

19.2%
12.5%
10.1%
2.7%
0.3%
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porate managements, fearful of what might have to be disclosed, will withhold
important information from boards to prevent controversy. Second is that because of concern about these disclosure requirements, competent people will
decline to serve on boards. Third, there is the risk that the power given directors will be abused. In our view, none of these concerns has merit.
As we pointed out above, information is the lifeblood of a board's operations. The absence of an adequate flow of information, perhaps more than
any other factor, is likely to lead directors to resign. 20 3 Moreover, to the extent that directors are becoming more concerned about meeting their responsibilities under state corporation laws and the federal securities laws, they are
apt to insist on receiving more information from management. Given these
factors, we do not give credence to the argument that managements will be
able to withhold important information from their boards of directors.
Similarly, we do not believe these disclosure requirements will make it
more difficult for registrants to find competent nonmanagement directors.
The argument that the supply of directors will dry up is made virtually every
time any action is proposed to increase directors' obligations.2 0 4 Curiously, this
argument is made in response to a proposal that will not so much increase the
responsibilities of outside directors as increase their power. The best answer
to it is that people should not accept positions that involve substantial responsibilities to others, such as corporate directorships, unless they are willing to
2 5
make the effort required to acquit themselves of those responsibilities.
Surely we should not endeavor to maintain a system in which the directors
are little more than figureheads. A second response, applicable to this situation, is that if this and other changes are made in the institutional framework
to provide directors with an opportunity to play a more constructive role,
more competent people are likely to demonstrate an interest in becoming
directors. 2 06 Thus, instead of drying up the supply, the proposed change is
likely to increase it and to contribute in another, indirect fashion to the revitalization of registrants' boards of directors.

203.

The Corporate Director's Guidebook. supra note 50, at 22, mentions only one situation in

which a director "in all likelihood should consider resigning." It is when "he believes that adequate information is not being provided . . . and is unsuccessful in his efforts to remedy that
situation . . ."
204.

See, e.g., Estes, Outside Directors: More Vulnerable Than Ever, 51 HARV. Bus. Rrv., Jan-Feb.

1973, at 107.
205. See Address by SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr., supra note 60.
206. See C. BROWN, supra note 44, at 90:
[l]t is no doubt true that, if the attractiveness of board membership were enhanced,
many highly competent people would seriously consider second careers as professional
directors after early retirement from a variety of first career experiences....
The possibility of a second career, involving a release from routine activities, the
prospect of living with intellectually exhilarating challenges, and an opportunity to
share in constructive leadership, would serve as a powerful magnet to attract experienced and talented people and, in time, enlarge the pool of those eligible for board
positions in the future.

114
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Finally, there is the fear that misguided directors will carry their threat to
resign to a point where management must yield or face needless embarrassment. Not every minority director will be as right as Odell. No doubt management could describe instances where outside directors were eased out quietly
because of incompetence and where the tale was best left untold. We are convinced that the risk must be incurred, especially since management can counter
foolishness with its version of the facts. As with our other recommendations
which incur the risk of abuse, we think the potential gain outweighs the costs.

